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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article calls for a situationist approach to teaching law,
particularly tort law. This new approach would begin by rejecting
the dominant, commonsense account of human behavior (sometimes
called dispositionism) and replacing it with the more accurate
account being revealed by social sciences, such as social psychology,
social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and other mind sciences.
At its core, situationism is occupied with identifying and
bridging the gap between what actually moves us, on the one hand,
and what we imagine moves us, on the other. Recognizing that gap
is critical for understanding why we have tort law, among other areas
of law. Beyond that, a situationist approach helps to make clear the
subconscious tendencies and unappreciated external forces that have
shaped tort law and tort reforms. A situationist perspective on tort
law, this Article argues, also has significant implications for how tort
law should be taught.
The Langdellian model of teaching, which has monopolized the
law school classroom since the late nineteenth century, has borne the
brunt of increasing criticism over the past several decades.' Most
critics emphasize that the casebook method forces the round
complexities of law, lawmaking, and human behavior into the square
holes of antiquated legal categories and idiosyncratic appellate
decisions.' A number of leading law schools are now dramatically
reshaping their curricula to address such concerns.'
Simultaneously, legal theory is in the midst of its own revolution
as legal scholars are beginning to reject the hard-core dispositionism
at the foundation of law and to incorporate, or at least to
acknowledge, emerging insights from the mind sciences.4 The
curricular and theoretical renovations underway represent what we
would call a turn toward the situationist. Those trends have created a
hospitable climate for the emergence of a more robust situationist
approach to law and law teaching. This Article describes not only

1. For a discussion of the Langdellian model, see infra Part III.
2. For a sample of critiques of the casebook method, see infra Part III.

3. See infra Part V.G.
4. See infra Part V.A.
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those trends and their implications but also some specifics regarding
how situationist torts would be taught and what a situationist torts
casebook would look like.
Part II introduces our approach by offering a situational account
of tort law, of the human animal, and of common attributions of
causation, responsibility, and blame. Part II also provides a
situationist perspective on policy and policymaking and highlights
four overlapping situational factors that have long influenced policy
and helped explain why dispositionist assumptions have persevered.
Those factors are simplicity, legitimacy, affirmation, and power.
Part III indicates some of the ways that situational forces have, since
the Langdellian revolution, encouraged a dispositionist approach
both to tort law and to how it is taught. Part IV briefly describes
what a situationist torts casebook might look like. And, finally, Part
V offers seven reasons why situationism is ripe and why a
situationist torts casebook may help to catalyze meaningful curricular
reform.
II. THE MYSTERIES AND FRONTIERS OF TORT LAW

A. What Is a Tort?
Anyone who teaches and writes about tort law long enough
eventually recognizes (or should recognize) that the frontiers of tort
law are determined by the outcomes of debates regarding a variety of
deep mysteries. Among those mysteries is this central enigma:
"what is a tort?" A simple question, most novices suppose. Any
answer, however, reveals the strikingly contingent nature of tort law.
In fact, the typical definition can be characterized as content-free
tautology. The late Dean William L. Prosser, one of the field's most
respected authorities, tells us that "tort" is "a term applied to a
miscellaneous and more or less unconnected group of civil wrongs
other than breach of contract for which a court of law will afford a
remedy in the form of an action for damages."5 Today's ultimate
authority, Wikipedia, more efficiently delivers the same message: "A

5.

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1941).
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tort is a civil wrong for which the law provides a remedy."6 In short,
a tort is what a court says it is.7
Push even slightly on that vacuous definition and one is
overcome by still deeper mysteries. For example, what sorts of
"harms" can count as a tort? Harms caused by a hurricane? What
about those resulting from an epidemic?
Tobacco?
Sexual
harassment? Drunk driving? Fast food? Again, the typical
newcomer expects those questions have clear answers, but they do
not.
Indeed, conventional responses to such questions have been in
flux across jurisdictions for decades. In the middle of the twentieth
century, for instance, cigarette manufacturers were immune from tort
liability, while manufacturers of less deadly products were subject to
strict liability. In the twilight of the twentieth century, the tobacco
industry suddenly was accountable for multi-billion dollar damage
awards while tort's impact on most other industries was waning.8
Those are just some of the expansions and contractions in the
reach of tort liability that have been described as "revolutionary" and
"counter-revolutionary." 9
Seismic
jurisprudential
shifts
notwithstanding, the courts that make and apply tort law often
pretend to abide by a stable and precedent-based area of law, in
6. Wikipedia, Fraud, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraud (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
7. See FOWLER V. HARPER, TORTS v, vi (1933) ("It is the social, rather than legalistic basis
of tort law that affords the unifying principles."); Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2005) ("Tort law tends to grow through judicial innovation.");
James Boyle, TheAnatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1011-12 (1985) ("One
standard way of presenting [the material] is to start with the difficulty of defining any of tort
law's operative concepts. In all but the most formalistic of classes, the students learn early on
that legal definitions alone are useless, without some idea of the background purpose of the
concept."). Other commentators have highlighted the ambiguities that underlie tort doctrine. See,
e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 179
(1996) (pointing out the "normally general and vague standards of tort law"); Ralph C.
McCullough, Intentional Torts and Bankruptcy: An Evaluation of Geiger v. Kawaauhau, 105
COM. L.J. 21, 23 (2000) ("[T]he concepts inherent in tort law lack precise definition.").
8. See Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies: PastEfficacy and Future Promise,41
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1721 (2008); see also ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE
RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007)
(detailing the culture, science, politics, and law of the cigarette).
9. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The
Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 passim (1993) (describing
intellectual underpinnings of the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary trends in products
liability law); Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The CounterRevolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 677-83 (2008) (describing the "revolution and counterrevolution in tort law").
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which basic precedents or principles are said to limit the boundaries
of its application. But careful, skeptical scholars know otherwise.
Beneath conventional answers to the question of what harms could or
should constitute "a tort" lurk unanswered mysteries'°--the very
mysteries that animate legal theory and the scholars who seek to
make sense of existing practices and that motivate symposia like this
one.
Even were one to explain why some harms count as torts while
others do not, there would still exist the puzzle of how a court or jury
determines who or what caused a harm. In a universe in which any
single event has innumerable causes and in which any major
outcome may have been contingent on a matter as trivial as the "want
of a horseshoe nail,"'1 it is no easy task to understand logically how
tort law narrows each harm down to one or two causes. That is what
legal scholars Fleming James and Roger Perry were famously
pointing out when, quoting John Milton, they observed that although
tort law possesses "a requirement that the wrongful conduct must be
a cause in fact of the harm," more is needed, "for 'the causes of
[harms] [are] infinite.""' 2 Similarly, tort giant Dan Dobbs highlights
that without the limits imposed by the amorphous doctrine of
''proximate cause," "liability would go on forever, one harm leading
endlessly to others."' 3 Judge Richard Posner, arguably the most
influential tort theorist and judge in the twentieth century, laments
the impossibility of logically apportioning causation among multiple
parties. According to Posner, for example, the problem with
10. Cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass Out ofMass Torts: Reflections ofa Dalkon
Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process,
31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 513, 549 (1998) (noting "bigger questions" such as "what harms should
substantively be recognized?"); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First Year Torts
Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511, 512 (2004) (describing "thought-provoking ... discussions
about .. . issues such as what harms are recognized, what harms could be recognized [as a
tort]");.
11. MOTHER GOOSE'S NURSERY RHYMES 191 (L. Edna Walter ed., A.C. Black, Ltd. 1922).
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
Id.
12. Fleming James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 761 (1951) (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted).
13. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 405, 445 (2000).
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"comparative negligence" is that "there is no methodology for
comparing the causal contributions of the plaintiffs and of the
defendant's negligence to the plaintiffs injury."' 4
Professor
Geoffrey Hazard underscores the mystery by pointing out that,
although comparative apportionments are "impossible in theory,"
they are somehow "feasible in practice."' 5 Indeed. But how?
That is a sample of some of the mysteries lurking beneath the
facade of tort doctrine. Those enigmas are fundamental to the topic
of this symposium-that is, how, where, and why tort law's
boundaries are set. Questions about tort law's perimeters inevitably
lead to discussions and debates about what methods one should use
for solving those puzzles and, within given methodological camps,
what can be said about their solutions.
As the contributions to this symposium illustrate, the
conventional and dominant perspective taken for solving tort law's
mysteries is from the inside. Equipped with a command of tort law's
doctrines and all of its best-known cases, scholars and judges peer
outward. Ensconced in the heart of the law, they identify the
boundaries of the field by making note of where torts stop. Rarely
do they look beyond that boundary to assess what happens with the
non-tortious harms, nor do they dwell on the possible boundaryshaping dynamics that might be occurring from the other side of the
frontier. Instead, scholars observe what "is," discern patterns and
trends, and then offer principles and reasons to make sense of them.
Being clever animals, we humans have a forceful desire and
uncanny capacity to concoct explanations for virtually any
phenomenon that strikes us-at times even dipping into the cauldron
of the magical and supernatural when more terrestrial options do not
suffice. 6 Were history a good teacher, humility would characterize
our attempts to explain social behavior. But it is not. Our errors,
though often evident in retrospect, are difficult to imagine, much less
accept, when a given theory has a grip on our thinking. 7 True to
14. Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989).
15. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY xii-xiii (Revised Proposed Official Draft 1999).
16. See Emily Pronin, Daniel M. Wegner, Kimberly McCarthy & Sylvia Rodriguez,
Everyday Magical Powers: The Role of Apparent Mental Causation in the Overestimation of
PersonalInfluence, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 218, 218-31 (2006).
17. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN
ANCIENT WISDOM 65 (2006); Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying
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form, different tort scholars have devised a range of possible
explanations to make sense of tort law as it is. Once those stories are
in place, "is" typically turns to "ought," and cases that require
deviations from those principles are seen as beyond the law's
boundaries-as "other" or "not tort law"-and the whole
arrangement is perceived as "the way things should be."' 8
How we get to know tort law thus shares much in common with
how we might get to know a person. We imagine that tort law has a
personality or disposition-likes and dislikes, a set of stable
preferences, areas of comfort and discomfort. We discern that
disposition by observing how tort law responds to different
situations. We study which claims tort law embraces and which it
rejects. It is as if we are assessing a friend's palate by observing the
foods she savors and those she eschews. Tort law's mysteries are
thus solved by studying doctrines and cases and examining which
claims are vindicated and which are dismissed. Individual plaintiffs
bring cases, and courts reach decisions based on a described set of
facts. The principles of tort law emerge from judicial holdings in
light of the cases' facts. 9 This basic schema for making sense of tort
law is depicted in Figure 1.

(Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 passim (2006) [hereinafter
Hanson & Hanson, Blame Frame].
18. Aaron C. Kay, Danielle Gaucher Jennifer M. Peach, Mark P. Zann & Steven J. Spencer,
Towards an Understanding of the Naturalistic Fallacy: System Justification and the Shift from Is
to Ought (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
19. True, sometimes judges are explicit about the principles underlying their decisions, but
judicial reasoning is only suggestive and can be misleading. Tort scholars recognize the fact that
judicial reasoning is often ad hoc and look for deeper principles to reconcile outcomes that jurists'
rhetoric typically cannot. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18 (2d
ed. 1972).
[T]he true grounds of legal decision are often concealed rather than illuminated by the
characteristic rhetoric of judicial opinions . . . . Indeed, legal education consists
primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds. It is
an advantage of economic analysis as a tool of legal study rather than a drawback that
it does not analyze cases in the conceptual modes employed in the opinions
themselves.
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FIGURE 1: THE TORT SCHEMA

Holding
Tort
Principles

In our view, that conventional way of understanding tort law is,
at best, misleading. Taken alone, it is the wrong way to solve the
great mysteries of tort law or to understand the "whys" and "wheres"
of basic boundary questions.
This Article is premised on the belief that a far more complete
and realistic understanding is to be had by altering one's perspective
of, and approach to, tort law. First, instead of studying tort law by
looking outward from within, scholars should begin by looking
inward from outside existing boundaries.
Second, instead of
assuming that we understand people and simply need to make sense
of tort law in light of that understanding, tort scholars should
recognize that, in fact, conventional schemas for the human animal
are fundamentally flawed. Consequently, it is not possible to
comprehend tort law without first having a more realistic conception
of ourselves. Third, instead of trusting the attributions of causation,
responsibility, and blame routinely made in the law, scholars and
judges should strive to take account of the many unappreciated
biases that silently manifest in those attributions.
Put differently, the answers to tort law's mysteries are located,
less in tort law, and more in long overlooked or misconstrued forces
within us. A meaningful understanding of law will come less from
scrutinizing the details of doctrine and more from understanding who
we are and how we make sense of ourselves and of the situations that
give rise to harms, injuries, and other untoward outcomes.
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That is the starting posture of the situationist or critical realist
approach to law.2" More specifically, situationism posits that legal
theory should be based on the most realistic account available of the
human animal-an understanding of the large gaps between what
moves us, on one hand, and how we make sense of our behavior, on
the other. To do so requires looking to the social sciences, including
social psychology, social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and
other mind sciences as well as to the insights gleaned from market
actors who specialize in persuasion and influence. In addition, we
look to history for lessons of what forces explain the existence of,
and changes in, tort law in contrast to the forces that scholars
examining tort law from the inside assume establish its core.21
In sum, understanding ourselves better will help us to demystify
the great tort mysteries and will raise normative doubts about where
tort boundaries are currently set and which harms should lie within
or outside the tort frontiers.22

20. For a sampling of situationist scholarship, see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situation: An Introduction to the SituationalCharacter,CriticalRealism, Power Economics, and
Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 149-77 (2003) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation]; see also Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and
Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically
Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
1103 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased]; Hanson & Hanson, Blame
Frame, supra note 17; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situational Character].
21. Historians have shown that tort law is the product of forces that seem quite alien to the
axioms, principles, and logic of tort theorists.
See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) (attributing the development of tort
law and other areas of common law to market forces that largely escaped public scrutiny rather
than to commonly assumed evolutions in legal theory); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN

LAW (2004) (describing the development of twentieth century accident law as the contingent or
accidental product of numerous ideas and institutional forces and not the inevitable product of
logic or common law principles); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict
Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110
YALE L.J. 333 (2000) (examining how "tragic dam failures," much more so than grandiose
revolutions in legal thought, explain American courts' adoption of strict liability in Fletcher v.
Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, I L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-E & I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868)).
22. The endeavor, while framed here in terms of tort law, is one that has implications for,
and could well be launched from, virtually any area of law. One grand takeaway from the
situationist approach is that multiplex connections exist among areas of law in our curricula,
libraries, and minds that tend to be packaged separately and perceived as independent
personalities. A goal of situationism is to see those connections so that they might be
disentangled.
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B. Volleyballs Are SituationalCharacters
Because the tasks of elaborating and defending that thesis have
been, and will continue to be, taken up elsewhere, we will not
expend much space or energy developing them here. As one might
imagine, the story of how people get things wrong when they make
sense of things is long, complicated, and counterintuitive. After all,
if people did not believe they were making sense of things when they
made sense of things, they would not conclude that they were
making sense. Make sense? Still, for those unfamiliar with the
breathtaking discoveries of the mind sciences,23 it may be helpful for
us to provide a sense of their flavor with the aid of an allusion.
Most of you will recall the Robinson Crusoe-esque plot of the
popular and critically acclaimed 2000 motion picture, Cast Away.24
Tom Hanks's character, Chuck, played a Federal Express employee
who survived on a deserted island for five years. If you have not
It was one of Hanks's best
seen the movie, you should.
performances, earning him a nomination for an Academy Award for
best actor in a leading role.25 That much you may remember. What
you probably do not recall is that Hanks, for that same movie, was
also nominated for MTV's "Best On-Screen Team" award.26 Many
of you may be scratching your head, asking: With whom could
Hanks have possibly co-won an award for best "team"? Wasn't
Chuck alone on an island for most of the movie?
The nomination went to Tom Hanks and Wilson.
"Wilson" is the volleyball from Wilson Sporting Goods that
washes up on the island together with other buoyant wreckage from
Chuck's ill-fated flight. Initially, the ball was just that: a ball. But
when Chuck cuts his hand trying to start a fire and angrily grabs and
heaves the ball, the blood from his hand leaves an image that would
quickly become Wilson's discerning countenance. With the addition
23. For an overview of that research, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, at
149-77, and accompanying citations. For continuously updated narratives relating to discoveries
of social psychologists and other mind scientists, see The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at
Harvard Law School, http://lawandmind.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
24. CAST AWAY (20th Century Fox 2000).
25. See Rick Lyman, Oscar, Master of Suspense; Some Top CategoriesAre Just Too Close
to Call, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at El. For a comprehensive list of Tom Hanks's awards and
nominations, see The Internet Movie Database, Awards for Tom Hanks, http://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0000158/awards (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
26. See The Internet Movie Database, supra note 25.
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of a few facial features, Chuck transforms the ball into a person with
a personality-"a mute, infinitely patient, non-living listener" 27 -and
a role-Chuck's only companion, friend, and therapist.
There is something quite powerful about Wilson's acting that
makes sense of the MTV award nomination. Breaking free of the
"ball" typecast, Wilson was believable as a person. An image that
looked very little like an actual "face" was all that was required for
Chuck and his audience to perceive a face (an illustration of the same
tendency that causes people to see a clown's face in a cloud or a
saint's face on a cinnamon bun). 8 Once some facial features were in
place, Wilson's personality or disposition emerged automatically.
To be sure, Tom Hanks's superb acting is partially why the ball
seemed so person-like. Still, the heaviest lifting was done in and by
our own minds; under the right conditions, we are subconsciously
eager to see a volleyball as a person. 9
As believable as Wilson was, there was also something mildly
humorous about Chuck's bond to the ball. The appeal of Wilson and
of his relationship with Chuck stems, we suspect, from the fact that
the audience could experience both the absurdity of the idea that
27. Wikipedia, Wilson the Volleyball, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilson the.Volleyball
(last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
28. In 1757, David Hume described the propensity this way:
There is a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves,
and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are familiarly
acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the
moon, armies in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by experience
and reflection, ascribe malice or good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us.
DAVID HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 446 (1826). Carl Sagan wrote in
1995:
As soon as the infant can see, it recognizes faces, and we now know that this skill is
hardwired in our brains. Those infants who a million years ago were unable to
recognize a face smiled back less, were less likely to win the hearts of their parents,
and less likely to prosper. These days, nearly every infant is quick to identify a human
face, and to respond with a goony grin.
CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE INTHE DARK 45 (1996);
see also Elizabeth Svoboda, Faces, Faces Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at FI (citing
research by Doris Tsao, a neuroscientist at the University of Bremen in Germany).
29. The confusion is not just the stuff of movies. The tendency to assign dispositions or
personhood to items that lack them--or to exaggerate the role of disposition-goes well beyond
sports equipment. We often speak of nations and corporations as if they were individuals who
acted according to a single, stable disposition. Our homes and cars develop personalities. Time
periods develop dispositions-we can encounter a good day or a bad year. We give names to and
perceive the intentions of everything from boats to mountains and from hurricanes to markets.
See Joel Garreau & Shankar Vedantam, Dealing with Scary Mr. Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,
2008, at Cl.
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Wilson was anything more than a ball and, at the same time, the
plausibility of Wilson as an actual, living person. It is as if part of us
was tricked by the illusion while another part of us could recognize
that we were being tricked. Wilson was obviously just a ball. Yet
Wilson was obviously much more than just a ball. In fact, to many,
the most poignant moment in the entire movie occurred when Wilson
fell off the raft and drifted out of Chuck's reach. Swept away
ourselves, we sniffled over the loss of a volleyball.0
But then we remind ourselves: Wilson was just a ball. And balls
are special. In minds that name and dispositionalize everything from
"Teddy" bears to boats or from homes to hurricanes, balls generally
remain balls. In fact, if ever there was an item that is moved more
obviously by something other than its own volition, it is a ball. Balls
are famous for not moving themselves-which is why we have
designed so many games and sports where the ball is the passive
object and the role of the people around it is to move it. Balls are
there to be kicked, dunked, passed, dribbled, punted, slammed,
rolled, thrown, dropped, batted, played, caught, chased, fumbled,
bowled, hit, gripped, tossed, lateralled, watched, bounced, and so on.
Balls do not have preferences. They do not think, and they do not
have a will. Balls do not choose. And as long as they are similar in
substance and construction, a ball is a ball, is a ball. We do not
usually think of a ball as our friend, much less expect it to cop an
attitude. Balls are quintessential situationalcharacters.
Believe it or not, by examining our reaction to Wilson, some of
the deeper mysteries of tort law are beginning to unravel. Our
readiness to find a disposition where none exists reflects the
workings of subconscious knowledge structures and implicit
motivations with which we make sense of the world-with which we
make causal attributions and draw inferences about things we cannot
see: motives, intentions, and the like. We find Chuck's relationship
with Wilson both compelling and amusing because we perceive the
reality of it and know the absurdity of it. Put differently, we know
Wilson, like any ball, was a situational character-that is, an object
30. Cf Nichoas Epley, Scott Akalis, Adam Waytz, & John T. Cacioppo, Creating Social
Connection Through Inferential Reproduction: Loneliness and Perceived Agency in Gadgets,
Gods, and Greyhounds, 19 PSYCHOL. SCi. 114 (2008) (describing and demonstrating how people
seek to maintain social connection with others and will, when human connection is not a viable
option, seek to connect socially with nonhumans).
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moved by something in its situation. And yet, because of a few
seeming facial features, we saw Wilson as a dispositional actor.
Wilson thus tickled our attributional schemas. That tickle thus
reveals the schemas' existence. 3 Once we understand that such
schemas are present and subject to such easy manipulation-at one
moment causing us grief, the next moment, amusement for feeling
grief-an important question emerges: if we are making sense of our
world largely with the aid of automatic, subconscious schemas, are
those schemas leading us to accurate, realistic understandings and
conclusions? More concisely: can our schemas be trusted?32
Well, the good news is that social scientists have been studying
that question for at least a half century. The bad news is that those
social scientists have discovered, initially to their own surprise, that
our schemas are, like little mind-demons, very often deceiving us,
while assuring us that they are reliable. To be sure, those schemas
are necessary, innumerable, and helpful in many ways. They are all
those things, but they are also jaw-droppingly misleading.
Do not misunderstand. Our claim is not that knowledge
structures and attributional schemas are always unhelpful or
incorrect. We are not about to assert, for instance, that "we've all
been wrong about balls," "that they really do have a personality and
intentions." Clearly they do not; so the conventional ball schema is
correct. Instead, the misleading effect of knowledge structures cuts
in the other direction and is displayed by our proclivity to see Wilson
as something more than a ball. Obviously, the fact that Wilson is not
a dispositional actor is hardly a shocking revelation. So let us try
again.
Consider this about the movie Cast Away: Chuck was not the
person we imagined he was-a fast-talking workaholic turned clever
survivalist. He was a character being played by Tom Hanks, subject
to a script, a set, a director's instructions, a huge budget (to try to pay
off), 33 an anticipated audience with an anticipated set of tastes and

31. See Chen & Hanson, CategoricallyBiased, supra note 20, at 1110-11 (describing the
connection of humor to knowledge structures).
32. By "schemas" we mean mental structures that help people organize information and
provide a framework for understanding the world. For an extensive discussion, see id. at 1133218.
33. Much to the relief of those involved with the film, Cast Away's combined and massive
production and advertising budget of approximately $125,000,000 was considerably eclipsed by
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tolerances, and so on. He was, no less than Wilson, a situational
character. Moviegoers simply imagined that Chuck was the person
with the personality that they came to associate with Chuck. That is
hardly a revelation, and yet many of our same readers, we suspect,
felt emotionally connected to, and moved by, the "Chuck" that they
were temporarily fooled into believing they were coming to know
when engrossed in the movie. That insight, too, is unlikely to
unclench many jaws.
Our big claim is not that "situational characters," such as
volleyballs and movie characters, are not real people, no matter how
much we might believe them to be. Rather, it is that "real people"
are much like Hollywood actors and volleyballs, no matter how
much we might believe that they are not.34 The human animal is a
situational character and quite unlike the dispositional actor
commonly supposed.35 That should strike many readers as at least a
little farfetched.
C. The Human Animal Is a Situational Character

To avoid being misunderstood, we should be more precise about
what we mean by "situationism."
As defined elsewhere,
"[s]ituationism is premised on the social scientific insight that the
naYve psychology-that is, the highly simplified, affirming, and
widely held model for understanding human thinking and behavioron which our laws and institutions are based is largely wrong. "36
So what is that highly simplified model of the human animal?
According to a group of cultural anthropologists and social
psychologists who have researched that question, "[t]he person is
believed to consist of a set of 'internal,' 'personal' attributes such as.
. . personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states, beliefs,
and attitudes ....

Taken together, these attributes define each person

its worldwide gross sales of $427,230,516.
The Numbers, Cast Away, http://www.thenumbers.com/movies/2000/CASTA.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
34. The analogy goes too far, of course. We accept the idea that humans have some agency,
and we know that there are different factors influencing the people and the law than influence
balls. A situationist approach is simply rejecting the dispositionist model that is at the heart of
law and dominant legal theories. We will have more to say about that presently.
35. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,supra note 20, passim; Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, passim.
36. The Situationist: About Situationsim, http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/aboutsituationism/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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as an autonomous, freely choosing, special individual. '37 They boil
down the simple attributional schema to the following elements:
* Actions are freely chosen.
* Choices imply a preference.
" Preferences are stable over time.
" Preferences implicate the identity of the self.
* Outcomes are mostly controllable.
" People are responsible for (and hence the self is
implicated in) the choices they make and the resultant
outcomes.38
From that starting point, it is easy to assume that each individual has
control over his or her own destiny and to credit or blame good and
bad conduct or outcomes accordingly.
As depicted in Figure 2, the person schema imagines that
through an individual's choices we learn something about her
preferences, which constitute the foundation of her identity. It is also
possible that her actions reflect the information she had in
contemplating her options (which is presumed accurate and
sufficient) or her will (which is presumed strong enough to abide by
her underlying preferences).39
FIGURE 2: THE PERSON SCHEMA

Prefer

37. Alan Page Fiske, Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel Rose Markus & Richard E. Nisbett, The

Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915, 920
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).

38. Id.
39. Both of those presumptions can be overcome. They would likely be rebutted, for
instance, in a situation involving a child partaking in an addictive activity.
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Those are the basic elements of what we call dispositionism or
the dispositionistperson schema. Given those elements, it makes

sense that people who do bad things should be punished, people who
do good things should be rewarded, and the situation should be
ignored. That is the "dispositionism" that we situationists maintain
is largely wrong and it is that conception that underlies naive theories
of the person, including those animating the legal system and
dominant legal theories.
Social psychologists Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett famously
described "the tendency to make unwarranted leaps from acts to
corresponding dispositions . . . [as] perhaps the most fundamental

and most common failing of social inference."4 As has been detailed
in other work, that "fundamental attribution error," as it is sometimes
called, has both external and internal components.4 A quick review
of a couple of the experimental demonstrations of that error may be
useful to readers new to this terrain. Consider this summary of one
of the classics:
[C]ollege students participated in a simulated quiz game
and were randomly assigned to either of two roles:
contestant or questioner.
Questioners were asked to
compose general-knowledge queries to be posed to the
contestants, and the contestants were instructed to answer
as many of the questions as they could. The situational
advantage of the questioners is clear, given that they could
draw from their areas of personal expertise, while
contestants were forced to answer questions on unfamiliar
topics. Therefore, it should not have been surprising that
contestants could only give a small percentage of correct
answers. Yet, when it came to estimating the intelligence
of the two groups, the situational advantage was forgotten:
both questioners and contestants grossly under-appreciated
the situational benefit of being a questioner. As a result,
both groups ranked the questioners as more generally
knowledgeable than contestants. In other words, the game

40. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 53 (1991).
41. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 20, passim.
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was perceived as a fair measure of general knowledge, and
the failure of contestants was attributed to disposition.42
The most famous study illustrating the power of situation and
the misleading effects of dispositonism is Stanley Milgram's socalled obedience experiment, in which ordinary people gave
seemingly fatal shocks to innocent victims. 43 Although Milgram's

research took place nearly five decades ago, it has recently attracted
a great deal of attention in both legal-academic 44 and popular
literature.45 To summarize the experiment, we draw from a recent
description 46 crafted by Phil Zimbardo, a former president of the
American Psychological Association, who may be the best-known
social psychologist in the history of the field and whose life and

42. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, at 169-71 nn.156-58 (footnotes
omitted) (citing Lee D. Ross et al., Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in Social-Perception
Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 485, 485-94 (1977)).
43. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL
VIEW (1974); see also THOMAS BLASS, THE MAN WHO SHOCKED THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND
LEGACY OF STANLEY MILGRAM (2004) (providing a highly readable and scholarly examination
of Milgram's contributions to social psychology).
44. A recent increase in the frequency with which legal scholars cite Milgram (and other
social psychologists) is depicted in Chart 1, infra. Milgram has been referenced in regard to a
variety of legal topics, such as Raj Dhanasekaran, When Rotten Apples Return: How the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878 Can Deter Domestic Law Enforcement Authorities from Using Military
Interrogation Techniques on Civilians, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 233, 260-61 (2006) (applying
Milgram's findings to military interrogation of civilians); Benjamin P. Falit, Curbing Industry
Sponsors' Incentive to Design Post-Approval Trials That Are Suboptimal for Informing
PrescribersBut More Likely Than Optimal Designs to Yield FavorableResults, 37 SETON HALL
L. REV. 969, 971-75 (2007) (predicting how the business practices of pharmaceutical companies
and related food and drug laws will evolve according to situational pressures as uncovered by
Milgram); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics: Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317,
1322-23 (2006) (discussing relevance of Milgram's findings to peer pressure and expectations for
group loyalty found in organizational structures).
45. As an illustration, last year ABC News re-created the Obedience Experiment for the
network's evening program "Primetime."
The results of ABC's study largely mimicked
Milgram's from five decades earlier. See Caroline Borge, Basic Instincts: The Science of Evil,
ABC NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=2765416&page=l;
see also The Milgram Experiment Today?, The Situationist, Dec. 22, 2007, http://
thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/12/22/the-milgram-experiment-today/ (discussing the ABC
study and other recent replications of the Obedience Experiment). In addition, a myriad of news
sources in recent years have incorporated Milgram's findings in their news-reporting or opinionmaking. See, e.g., Paul Bloom, Morality Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2008, at BR 22 (utilizing
Milgram's Obedience Experiment while reviewing KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN
ETHICS (2008)); Daniel Weiss, What Would You Do?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb.
2008, at 41 (explaining how Milgram's experimental methodologies have been incorporated by
journalists when surveying human behavior).
46. See Philip Zimbardo, When Good People Do Evil, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2008,
http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2007_0 1/milgram.html.
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research shared much in common with Milgram's.47 Zimbardo
writes:
Imagine that you have responded to an advertisement
in the New Haven newspaper seeking subjects for a study
of memory. A researcher whose serious demeanor and
laboratory coat convey scientific importance greets you and
another applicant at your arrival at a Yale laboratory ....
You are here to help science find ways to improve people's
learning and memory through the use of punishment. The
researcher tells you why this work may have important
consequences. The task is straightforward: one of you will
be the "teacher" who gives the "learner" a set of word
pairings to memorize. During the test, the teacher will give
each key word, and the learner must respond with the
correct association. When the learner is right, the teacher
gives a verbal reward, such as "Good" or "That's right."
When the learner is wrong, the teacher is to press a lever on
an impressive-looking apparatus that delivers an immediate
shock to punish the error.
The shock generator has 30 switches, starting from a
low level of 15 volts and increasing by 15 volts to each
higher level. The experimenter tells you that every time the
learner makes a mistake, you have to press the next switch.
The control panel shows both the voltage of each switch
and a description. The tenth level (150 volts) is "Strong
Shock"; the 17th level (255 volts) is "Intense Shock"; the
25th level (375 volts) is "Danger, Severe Shock." At the
29th and 30th levels (435 and 450 volts) the control panel is
marked simply with an ominous XXX: the pornography of
ultimate pain and power.
You and another volunteer draw straws to see who will
play each role; you are to be the teacher, and the other
volunteer will be the learner. He is a mild-mannered,
middle-aged man whom you help escort to the next
chamber. "Okay, now we are going to set up the learner so
he can get some punishment," the experimenter tells you
47. To read Phil Zimbardo's description of his overlapping experiences with Stanley
Milgram (including being classmates in high school), see id.
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both. The learner's arms are strapped down and an
electrode is attached to his right wrist. The generator in the
next room will deliver the shocks. The two of you
communicate over an intercom, with the experimenter
standing next to you. You get a sample shock of 45 voltsthe third level, a slight tingly pain-so you have a sense of
what the shock levels mean. The researcher then signals
you to start.
Initially, your pupil does well, but soon he begins
making errors, and you start pressing the shock switches.
He complains that the shocks are starting to hurt. You look
at the experimenter, who nods to continue. As the shock
levels increase in intensity, so do the learner's screams,
saying he does not think he wants to continue. You hesitate
and question whether you should go on.
But the
experimenter insists that you have no choice. ...
How far up the scale do you predict that you would go
under those orders? Put yourself back in the basement with
the fake shock apparatus and the other "volunteer"actually the experimenter's confederate, who always plays
the learner because the "drawing" is rigged-strapped
down in the next room. As the shocks proceed, the learner
begins complaining about his heart condition. You dissent,
but the experimenter still insists that you continue. The
learner makes errors galore. You plead with your pupil to
concentrate; you don't want to hurt him. But your concerns
and motivational messages are to no avail. He gets the
answers wrong again and again. As the shocks intensify, he
shouts out, "I can't stand the pain, let me out of here!"
Then he says to the experimenter, "You have no right to
keep me here!" Another level up, he screams, "I absolutely
refuse to answer any more! You can't hold me here! My
heart's bothering me!"
Obviously you want nothing more to do with this
experiment. You tell the experimenter that you refuse to
continue. You are not the kind of person who harms other
people in this way. You want out. But the experimenter
continues to insist that you go on. He reminds you of the
contract, of your agreement to participate fully. Moreover,

Summer 2008]

SITUA TIONIST TORTS

he claims responsibility for the consequences of your
shocking actions. After you press the 300-volt switch, you
read the next keyword, but the learner doesn't answer.
"He's not responding," you tell the experimenter. You
want him to go into the other room and check on the learner
to see if he is all right. The experimenter is impassive; he is
not going to check on the learner. Instead he tells you, "If
the learner doesn't answer in a reasonable time, about five
seconds, consider it wrong," since errors of omission must
be punished in the same way as errors of commission-that
is a rule.
As you continue up to even more dangerous shock
levels, there is no sound coming from your pupil's shock
chamber. He may be unconscious or worse. You are truly
disturbed and want to quit, but nothing you say works to get
your exit from this unexpectedly distressing situation. You
are told to follow the rules and keep posing the test items
and shocking the errors.
Now try to imagine fully what your participation as the
teacher would be. If you actually go all the way to the last
of the shock levels, the experimenter will insist that you
repeat that XXX switch two more times. I am sure you are
saying, "No way would I ever go all the way!" Obviously,
you would have dissented, then disobeyed and just walked
out. You would never sell out your morality. Right?
Milgram once described his shock experiment to a
group of 40 psychiatrists and asked them to estimate the
percentage of American citizens who would go to each of
the 30 levels in the experiment. On average, they predicted
that less than 1 percent would go all the way to the end, that
only sadists would engage in such sadistic behavior, and
that most people would drop out at the tenth level of 150
volts. They could not have been more wrong.
In Milgram's experiment, two of every three (65
percent) of the volunteers went all the way up to the
maximum shock level of 450 volts. The vast majority of
people shocked the victim over and over again despite his
increasingly desperate pleas to stop. Most participants
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dissented from time to time and said they did not want to go
on, but the researcher would prod them to continue.4"
These results surprised everyone, including Milgram, who did not
expect individuals could be so easily led to do harm. 49 For our
purposes, the greatest significance of Milgram's experiment is this:
people often behave in ways that contradict how they imagine they
would. The experiment thus reveals not only how "good people" can
become "bad apples" and engage in "evil conduct," but also, more
generally, how our actions are frequently not the consequences of
some imagined set of stable preferences, informed by our thinking,
and operated through our will. We are buffeted and blown about by
hard-to-see situational influences around and within us, at the same
time that we chalk up our behavior to identity-revealing choice. We
are more like "balls" than we are like the "people" who we imagine
ourselves to be.
D. Attributions Are Situational Characters

This section returns to the mysteries of how the dispositionist
person schema might influence attributions of causation,
responsibility, and blame. Our hypothesis is that the attributional
tendencies discovered through social science will powerfully shape,
perhaps determine, the law itself. With those discoveries in mind,

48. See id. According to Zimbardo, Milgram's findings have been replicated and extended
by researchers around the globe:
Recently, Thomas Blass of the University of Maryland-Baltimore County
[author of The Man Who Shocked The World and creator of the terrific website
StanleyMilgram.Com] analyzed the rates of obedience in eight studies conducted in the
United States and nine replications in European, African, and Asian countries. He
found comparably high levels of compliance in all. The 61 percent mean obedience
rate found in the U.S. was matched by the 66 percent rate found across all the other
national samples. The degree of obedience was not affected by the timing of the
studies, which ranged from 1963 to 1985.
Other studies based on Milgram's have shown how powerful the obedience
effect can be when legitimate authorities exercise their power within their power
domains. In one study, most college students administered shocks to whimpering
puppies when required to do so by a professor. In another, all but one of 22 nurses
flouted their hospital's procedure by obeying a phone order from an unknown doctor to
In still another, a
administer an excessive amount of a drug (actually a placebo) ....
group of 20 high school students joined a history teacher's supposed authoritarian
political movement, and within a week had expelled their fellows from class and
recruited nearly 200 others from around the school to the cause.
Id.
49. See MILGRAM, supra note 43, at 13-14, 123.
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therefore, it may be possible to shed some light on which sort of
harms will fall within or beyond the frontiers of tort law.
Social psychologists have studied what they sometimes call our
"naive attributional"5' understandings of how we determine causation
and, when appropriate, attribute responsibility and blame.
Describing and detailing that research would be too significant an
undertaking for this brief Article. We can, however, provide a
cursory overview.
The most basic version of the attributional model developed
from that naive theory is as follows: perceptions lead to attributions,
attributions lead to emotions, and emotions lead to behavioral
responses. When something unexpected and untoward occurs, our
minds automatically seek an explanation. And our emotional
reaction to the underlying outcome will depend on how our minds
answer several questions: Which actor or actors do we associate with
the harmful outcome? Did that actor act with volition, knowledge,
and control? Did the actor intend the act? Did the actor intend the
harm? And what motives lay behind the intention and actions? The
naive or folk theory of attributions holds that our inferences
regarding a person's volition, knowledge, control, intention, and
motive shape our attributions. The stronger those inferences
regarding a given actor, the more strongly we tend to feel that that
actor caused, is responsible for, and is to blame for the outcome.
Although people rarely peer inside the black box of their attributions,
a little naive introspection typically reveals those sorts of factors.

50. See, e.g., Richard J. Shakarchi, The Effects of the Intuitive Prosecutor Mindset on Person
Memory (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University), available at
http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?osu1040044498 (citing Harold H. Kelley, Attribution
Theory in Social Psychology, 15 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 192, 193 (1967)).
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FIGURE 3: NAIVE ATTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

-llJ
And the more definitively we make those attributions, the
greater our emotional reaction and urge to respond behaviorally to
the event and the individuals involved-anger toward, and an urge to
punish, the injurer and pity toward, and an urge to compensate, the
victim.5 '
That brief summary should not strike the reader as especially
controversial or insightful, given that it purports to be a summary of
what most believe is at the core of our attributions. It is, in other
words, common sense. Still, making it explicit can be somewhat
useful. Some of the mysteries of tort law might, at least in a naive
way, be solved by considering that folk theory of attributions.
Specifically, we can loosely predict that tort remedies (and other
legal remedies) will tend to exist for those harms where, on one
hand, an "injurer" is perceived to have had sufficient knowledge,
volition, and control (and even more so if that injurer is perceived to
have acted intentionally and with a bad motive) while, on the other
hand, the "victim" is perceived to have acted with significantly less
knowledge, volition, and control. In such cases, the desire to punish
and the desire to compensate will lead to liability and damages paid
by the injurer to the victim 52

51. See Jon Hanson & Ana Reyes, Attributional Positivism, The Naive Psychology Behind
Our Laws (Apr. 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); Jon Hanson & Michael
McCann, Situationist Policy: The Theory (Sept. 27, 2008) (unpublished working paper, on file
with authors) [hereinafter Hanson & McCann, Situationist Policy].
52. Note that the tort case will typically include a built-in comparison between at least two
parties. Although most naive theories of causation, responsibility, and blame assume that there
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FIGURE 4: BAsIC ATTRIBUTIONAL MODEL

Again, that is only the naive theory of tort law and its mysteries.
It nonetheless might help explain some of the more general contours
of tort law or of the naive explanations given for that tortscape.
Indeed, general descriptions of tort law proffered by prominent tort
authorities sometimes do comport with our simple prediction. For
instance, Prosser and Keeton explain:
Apparently courts have . . . worked out an irregular and

poorly defined sliding scale, by which the defendant's
liability is least where the conduct is merely inadvertent,
greater for acts in disregard of consequences increasingly
likely to follow, .. and greatest of all where the motive is a
malevolent desire to do harm.53

But the deeper solutions to tort law's mysteries, and a deeper
understanding of what determines the dimensions and boundaries of
tort law, are to be found by studying what social psychologists and
other mind scientists have discovered about the implicit or situational
mechanisms behind our attributions of causation, responsibility, and
blame.54 The general lesson of that research is clear: our attributions
of causation, responsibility, and blame-and our assessments of
knowledge, control, intentions, and motives-are not what we
suppose they are. Indeed, our presumptions about others and
are some absolute standards used to make such determinations, in practice, at least in the tort law
context, the determinations have a hefty relative component.
53. WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 37 (5th ed. 1984).

54. See Hanson & Reyes, supra note 51. See generally NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME:
How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS passim (2001) (employing attribution theory

to explain how jurors use a combination of common sense, facts, and law in an attempt to make a
just decision).
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ourselves are typically wrong or subject to significant qualification.
Again, this is not the place to defend such bold assertions, but it is
also too provocative a claim to leave wholly unsupported. So let us
offer a few quick examples of the sort of discoveries we have in
mind.
First consider dispositionism 5
Our proclivity to attribute
human actions to the dispositions of the person and not the situation
is the most basic of attributional biases (which is not to say that it is
without exceptions).
Our attributions will likewise seldom
acknowledge the integral role of situation and too often focus on the
less meaningful role of a person's disposition. In addition, our
attributions will also reflect, much less than we realize, our own
affective responses, implicit associations, and implicit motives. 6
Those interior situational forces will often operate automatically, and
the reasons that we offer for our attributions will rarely reflect the
actual motor behind our attributions.
Instead, they are the
rationalizations that we concoct for ourselves and for others to make
sense of our attributions.
For instance, without our being aware of it, we will react with
heightened negativity toward proximate and salient individuals
associated with an injury, especially when their conduct deviates
from expectations or norms of behavior or when they are members of
outgroups 7 Similarly, our attributions will, beneath the radar of
consciousness, reflect our widely-held urge to maintain our beliefs in
a just world and a legitimate system." Our sympathy toward a
victim will likewise reflect the number of victims that there are and
the tractability of compensating those victims. 59 In addition, our
55. See supra text accompanying notes 37-49 and accompanying notes.
56. For an overview, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,supra note 20.
57. See, e.g., Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 20 (describing how we blame obese
persons for their obesity without considering situational explanations, and how our indignation
partly reflects how our minds classify obese persons as part of a different and inferior social
group).
58. See MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION
11-12 (1980); Hanson & Yosifon, The SituationalCharacter,supra note 20, at 101-05; John T.
Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The Psychology of System Justificationand the PalliativeFunction of
Ideology, 13 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 115-16 (2002); Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller,
Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL.
1030, 1030 (1978).
59. See Paul Slovic, "If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act": Psychic Numbing and
Genocide, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 79 passim (2007), available at http:lI
joumal.sjdm.org/jdm7303a.pdf; Paul Slovic, Numbed by Numbers, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar. 2007,
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attributions will be skewed by the attributions that others make and
the frame through which we first consider the untoward outcome.
And our assessments of whether someone, say, acted "intentionally,"
will itself depend on factors that would seem unrelated to the
question of intent.6"
In those ways, and many others, our attributions are themselves
situational characters-determined, not so much by the underlying
truth of the matter, but by hidden features in our interiors, unnoticed
elements of our environs, and interactions between the two.
That, in our view, supplies the key to solving the great mysteries
of tort law and to understanding its existing boundaries: to
understand tort law, one must understand the implicit situational
factors that contribute to the explicit attributions that we offer to
rationalize our desire to punish some and compensate others.
E. PoliciesAre SituationalCharacters

The discussion so far has sketched three interrelated ways in
which our knowledge structures mislead us. We have, in other
words, noted three broken, but dominant, schemas: our tort schema,
our person schema, and our attributional schema. First, we presume
that tort law is like a "person"-that it has a purpose or disposition
that is discoverable through observation. Second, we presume that a
person is like a "person"-that her actions are the consequences of
her thinking, preferences, and will. Third, we presume that our
attributions of causation, responsibility, and blame (and underlying
assessments of volition, control, intent, and motive) are accurate and
based in reality.
The mind sciences have challenged all of those presumptions in
similar ways. In each case, social scientists have discovered that our
http://www.foreignpolicy.con/story/cms.php?storyjd=3751 ("Psychologists have found that the
statistics of mass murder or genocide-no matter how large the numbers-do not convey the true
meaning of such atrocities. The numbers fail to trigger the affective emotion or feeling required
to motivate action. In other words, we know that genocide in Darfur is real, but we do not 'feel'
that reality. In fact, not only do we fail to grasp the gravity of the statistics, but the numbers
themselves may actually hinder the psychological processes required to prompt action."); see also
George F. Loewenstein, Deborah Small & Jeff Strnad, Statistical, Identifiable and Iconic Victims
and Perpetrators (Mar. 2005) (Stanford Law Sch. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 301), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-678281 (discussing "the identifiable victim
effect"--the greater sympathy shown toward identifiable victims than statistical victims-and
some of its influence on policymaking).
60. See Joshua Knobe, Theory of Mind and Moral Cognition: Exploring the Connections, 9
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 357, 357-59 (2005) (providing a brief review of the literature).
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naive understandings reflect ill-advised faith in our perceptions and
reasons. We are getting it wrong: it is as if we are assigning a name
and personality to a ball.
The situationist approach to policy requires, first, resisting the
temptation to infer a disposition and, second, developing the
cognitive muscle necessary for viewing, among other things, people,
our laws, and our attributions as ball-like situational characters.
Situationism means being suspicious of our intuitions and skeptical
of common sense. As physicists might, we need to look at the
numerous forces that can account for how and why balls-ourselves,
our laws, and our attributions-move as they do.
In other work, we have described four overlapping situational
forces that seem to be particularly influential. Although this is not
the place for particulars, we can provide a flavor of those four
factors, which may be helpful in illustrating why dispositionism is
generally the dominant attributional perspective. They are as
follows:
" SIMPLICITY: Because of various constraints on our
cognitions, time, and resources, we are motivated to
accept explanations and attributions that are easily
managed within existing knowledge structures and that
provide cognitive closure, even if such simplicity comes
at a cost to accuracy.6' Similarly, we prefer policies that
are easy to imagine, design, and implement.
" PLAUSIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY: Because of our selfconceptions, and our need to explain our behavior, we
are motivated to accept explanations and attributions that
seem accurate, correct, realistic, coherent, and legitimate
and that lend legitimacy to the resultant policy.62 As it
happens, those considerations are often the most
prominent of the attributional constraints at the marginright here, right now regardingthis policy question-but
61. See Hanson & McCann, Situationist Policy, supra note 51. There are certainly times
when that motive is overcome by other situational forces, including other motives. At times, for
instance, individuals may crave complex explanations and attributions, such as when complexity
and doubt permit them to believe or behave as they like. See id.
62. See id. Different ways to establish plausibility include appeals to direct observation ("it
is so, because anyone can see it is so"), appeals to authority ("it is so because authority X said it is
so"), and appeals to process ("it is so because the process it went through leads to its being so").
Id.
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it is often the weakest of the attributional constraints in
the long run.63
AFFIRMATION: Our attributions are highly sensitive to
three interrelated motives to affirm ourselves on different
levels: (1) self-affirmation; (2) group-affirmation; and
(3) system-affirmation.' 4 The self-affirmation motive
reflects the motive to bolster and rationalize the
perceived interests and esteem of the self. The groupaffirmation motive is the motive to defend, bolster, and
rationalize the interest and status of one's in-group.
And, the system-affirmation motive is the motive to
defend, bolster, and rationalize the interests and
legitimacy of the social system (defined at various levels
including institutions, hierarchies, organizations, and
societies).65 Among the perceptions of ourselves, our
groups, and our systems, which are motivated to affirm,
is a notion that we are just, that salient inequalities,
injuries, harms, can either be justified or, if not, that the
injurer is punished and the victim is compensated for the
injury

*
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POWER: Because attributions matter for different
individuals, entities, institutions, and groups and because
those attributions are manipulable, those individuals,
entities, institutions, or groups with the most power
(which, briefly, we will define here simply as the ability
to influence external and internal situation with respect
to attributions) will wield disproportionate influence
over which attributions become dominant and most
67
influential over policy.

63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. A growing body of evidence reveals that the last of the three affirmation motives
will often trump the first two when there is a conflict. See id.
66. See id. Social psychologists such as John Jost have discovered that a perceived threat to
the stability or legitimacy of existing arrangements ("system threat") leads most peopleincluding those disadvantaged by the system-to defend the status quo through legitimizing
attributional schemas and stereotypes that help to turn what "is" into what "ought to be." See Jost
& Hunyady, supra note 58, at 126 -28.
67. Hanson & McCann, Situationist Policy, supra note 51.
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One well-known policy example may help illustrate the
interactions of those four factors and their influence: the regulatory
response to smoking-caused harms.68 For much of the twentieth
century, the tobacco industry managed to avoid the costs of tort
liability by shaping attributions of causation, responsibility, and
blame regarding the risks of smoking. Although the strategies varied
depending upon the situation (including the audience and the
changing plausibility of competing attributions over time), probably
the single most important and effective strategy involved promoting
the conception of the smoker as an autonomous, liberated chooser.
That was an important strategy for at least two reasons. First,
manufacturers could make their products more desirable to
consumers by associating them with autonomy ("I choose to smoke;
therefore, I am a "Marlboro Man" or a liberated "Virginia Slim").
Second, the dispositionist schema helped shield manufacturers from
liability or regulation ("he chose to smoke, therefore he, not the
manufacturer, is to blame for his lung cancer"). That dispositionist,
choice-based perspective of smokers was one that individual
manufacturers devoted billions of dollars to promoting.
The beauty of dispositionism, from the tobacco industry's
perspective, is not simply the fact that it moves products and protects
profits. Dispositionism works also because it is simple ("she smokes
because she wants to") and plausible ("are you saying that she didn't
choose to smoke?"). Finally, dispositionism is affirming: smokers
want to believe they choose to smoke; non-smokers want to believe
that smokers choose to smoke; and we all like to believe that the
more than 400,000 U.S. deaths per year associated with smoking do
not reflect something unappealing about the rest of us or unjust about
our system-rather, the victim's preference-based choices.69
68. This quick overview borrows from work that one of us has been doing for the last decade
on tobacco industry practices. See, e.g., Hanson & Hanson, Blame Frame,supra note 17, at 44555; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic Theory and Legal
Regulation, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, AND POLICY 229, 229-76 (Paul Slovic ed. 2001);
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking BehavioralismSeriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467-1551 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kyar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 passim (1998);
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation,supra note 20, at 247-68.
69. Dispositionist attributions dominate most policy debates, notwithstanding the far more
powerful role of situation. For examples, see Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 20, at
1770-98; Hanson & Hanson, Blame Frame, supra note 17, at 413 passim.
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For those reasons, dispositionism is extraordinarily easy to
promote through situational manipulation. 7' As the cigarette example
indicates, profit-maximizing firms can exercise their comparative
power over the situation to reinforce "common sense" regarding who
we are and what moves us.7
Taking a situationist perspective makes it easier to understand
how the situational characters we described above-our laws, our
attributions, ourselves-are influenced by a competition or
tournament among individuals, groups, institutions, and interests.
Each has a stake in promoting certain perceptions and discouraging
others, and the playing field on which this competition over the
situation takes place is itself hidden largely in the situation. When
looking through dispositionist lenses, that competition and its effects
are far more difficult to recognize or take seriously.
A situationist understanding of what moves us, our attributions,
and our policies, all calls for, among other things, a new way of
teaching law and a new sort of teaching materials. In the next
section, we consider what a situationist torts casebook might look
like.
III.

DISPOSITIONIST TORT LAW AND THE CASEBOOK
METHOD ARE SITUATIONAL CHARACTERS

A. DispositionistTort Law Is a
SituationalCharacter

As we summarized above, the dispositionist view of, and
approach to, tort law is dominant-so dominant, in fact, that as
Professor Menkel-Meadow explains, "[A] major rethinking of legal

70. It was not until the end of the twentieth century, and then only for a relatively short time,
that the tobacco industry lost its grip on the competition over relevant attributions. That is true
largely because of the efforts of whistle-blowers, scientists, and lawyers who finally managed,
with the help of some headline-grabbing revelations and a cascade of media focus, to challenge
the choice narrative. Evidence that the industry targeted children, that the product was addictive,
that non-smokers were being harmed by secondhand smoke, that states were paying for the costs
of smokers, that the industry had withheld information about the health risks and addictiveness of
their products, and so on, all combined to flip the blame-the-victim attributions that had been
such a valuable industry shield. And, of course, as the attributions changed, so did tort law.
Briefly, at least, tobacco industry became subject to multi-billion dollar damage awards. See
supra text accompanying notes 8, 68-69.
71.

See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, at 202-78 (describing

the process of shaping how we understand as "deep capture").
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education has not occurred, really, in over one hundred years. '"7
Even the idea that tort law has an essence or personality-a set of
preferences, goals, and attitudes or, if you like, stable principles or
doctrines-and that that personality can be discovered through
careful study of the cases is still with us.73 Still more entrenched is
the dispositionist view of the person subject to tort law: each
individual is presumed to be moved by her preferences, thinking, and
free will. Such is the presumption except when a person's behavior
occurs in the presence of extraordinarily salient situational forces. A
gun to one's head or a tempest at one's stern, for instance, captures
our attention, and there are a small number of less dramatic
influences that we are schematically primed to look for, such as the
incentivizing effects of prices or taxes.74 In light of the flaws of this
dispositionist approach, the question emerges as to why it continues
to be dominant. The brief answer is simple: dispositionist tort law is
itself a situational character.75
In important ways, the dispositionism in law and legal
institutions is historically contingent.
Christopher Columbus
Langdell, the founding father of legal education as we know it, was a
hard-core dispositionist.
The still-dominant Langdellian case
method, which "posited that students could learn both substantive
legal principles and legal analysis by studying cases to distill the
essential principles and doctrines that courts applied,"76 reflects that
72. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and _
Really Seriously: Before, During and
After "The Law ", 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 580 (2007).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19 (describing the widespread assumption that
one can discern the law's disposition-a disposition that, once identified, is to be respected and
promoted).
74. Even the latter situational forces are typically assumed to be internalized through reason
and conscious processing informed by preferences. See Hanson & Hanson, Blame Frame,supra
note 17, at 426 n.50 (describing "naive situationism"); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra
note 20, at 168-76, 201-18 (providing fuller discussion of the sort of situational forces that we
tend to see). For a more detailed summary of the contrast between relatively situationist and
relatively dispositionist perspectives on tort law, see Table 1, infra pp. 111-16.
75. The following section will touch on only a few brief examples of situational forces
behind dispositionist tort law. There is much more to be said about those forces than we can even
summarize here. For a recent article discussing some of the methods by which dispositionists
maintain their faulty attributional schemas in the face of situationist insights, see Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: MaintainingFalse Perceptionsin Policy Debates, 57
EMORY L.J. 499 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson, Nafve Cynicism].
76. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, All Stressed up But Not Sure Where to Go: Pondering the
Teaching of Adversarialism in Law School, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165 (1989) (reviewing
STEPHAN LANDMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION (1988)).
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dispositionist view of law. The Langdellian mission was to teach
students the law's disposition through the study of cases. As he put
it, the law
consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a
mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human
affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to
acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest
student of law.77
One reason for the success of Langdell's reform was that at the
very moment he implemented his new system for teaching and
learning law, dispositionism lay at the core of the legal culture.
Furthermore, in part because of Langdell's approach, the laws and
institutions built at that time would reinforce the dispositionist
starting point. Craig Haney summarizes that recursive dynamic as
follows:
The formative era of American law in the United States
However, the 19th
occurred during the 19th century ....
century was also the era of laissez-faire capitalism and
"rugged

individualism"

.

.

.

in which freedom and

autonomy were celebrated in the popular ethos. Widely
shared political and economic beliefs supported the view
that most actions originated in the free and unencumbered
choices of the persons who engaged in them.
Social Darwinism-the belief that people survived and
succeeded because of their genetic endowment and its
relative adaptability-was the prevailing theory that unified
the nascent social sciences. Psychology was dominated by
the Jamesian "will," instinct theory . . . and the eugenics
movement. . . . [T]he overarching view of human nature
that characterized this period . . . [was] the belief that

individuals were the causal locus of behavior, that socially
problematic and illegal behavior therefore arose from some
defect in the individuals who performed it, and that such
behavior could be changed or eliminated only by effecting

77. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS vii (1871). For a concise history of Langdell and his influence on law teaching, see
Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 196 (1995).
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changes in the nature or characteristics of those problematic
persons.
... [Steven] Lukes... has termed the worldview that
prevailed during this period abstract individualism and
described it as the belief that the crucial features of
individuals determined social arrangements and that those
features were "assumed as given, independently of a social
context" ....
Thus, the intellectual milieu of our nation's formative
legal era was characterized by a conception of behavior that
focused almost exclusively on individuals and deemphasized or ignored the influence of social context or
conditions in shaping thought and action. The rugged
American individualist was embraced as our national
character type. Not surprisingly, the law that was formed
during this period bore the imprint of this individualism.
Legal doctrines and institutions were created and others
transformed to reflect this legal theory of behavior, one in
which autonomous individuals were at the center of the
causal universe and social context was regarded as legally
secondary, largely unimportant, or utterly irrelevant.
The coincidence of both the age of psychological
individualism and the formative era of American law meant
that this model of behavior was literally institutionalized in
our legal system. Unlike other intellectual enterprises, the
law translates its tentative hypotheses and operating
assumptions into doctrinal precedents that harden over time
and become exceedingly difficult to overturn. Indeed, it
often uses them as the foundation for institutions whose
sheer physical scale, political significance, and long-term
effect on the popular consciousness make them permanent
fixtures in the social landscape. Thus, the legacy of this
19th-century view of human nature persisted in law long
after many of its intellectual premises were challenged or
abandoned by emerging academic disciplines, often in the
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face of convincing social-scientific evidence that
documented their profound limitations.78
We fully concur with Haney's incisive description, but would add
two things. First, the edge that dispositionism initially enjoyed over
situationism may be as robust today as it was when Langdell was the
Dean at Harvard Law School. 79 Second, the first-mover advantage
that Haney describes for dispositionist legal schemas, though
important, is only a small part of the story for why dispositionism
has generally triumphed. As has been argued at length elsewhere,
for instance, dispositionism is advantaged because of numerous
manipulable internal situational forces, including subconscious
motives for simplicity, closure, self-affirmation, group-affirmation,
and system-affirmation.8" In addition, most of us occupy external
situations that generally encourage dispositionist attributions.8
Furthermore, there are powerful groups and entities with a stake in
promoting dispositionism and with a history of successfully
protecting that stake.82 The fact that virtually all of our laws and
legal institutions as well as most of our cultural beliefs and social,
political, and economic institutions are built upon dispositionist
premises also helps to explain why any one area of law or single
legal institution remains dispositionist in orientation. To challenge
dispositionism in one setting is, in effect, to challenge our entire
system-and threats to the system create a form of dissonance within
most people that itself encourages dispositionist attributions.83
78. Craig Haney, Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model ofJustice, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 5-6 (2002).
79. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and CorporateLaw, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004) (describing the dispositionist
schemas underlying all areas of American law, particularly in the last decades of the 20th
century); Hanson & Hanson, Blame Frame, supra note 17, passim (broadly describing the history
of dispositionist schemas over the last few centuries of American history); Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situation, supra note 20, at 287-302 (illustrating the dispositionist presumptions of various
areas of law); Hanson & Yosifon, SituationalCharacter,supra note 20 (same).
80. For an extensive, general discussion of those internal situational forces, see Adam
Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human
Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 321-30 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado &
Hanson, GreatAttributional Divide]; Hanson & Hanson, Blame Frame,supra note 17, at 448-54.
81. See Hanson & Benforado, GreatAttributional Divide, supra note 80, at 339-48.
82. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20, at 223-29.
83. For examples of how situationist attributions often lead to system-justifying
dispositionist backlash, see Benforado & Hanson, Nai've Cynicism, supra note 75, at 536-38 and
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of Legal Theorists to
SituationistInsights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2008).
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B. The CasebookMethod Is a SituationalCharacter
The longevity of dispositionism reflects another key situational
factor on which we now want to focus. To do so, it is helpful to
recognize that accompanying Langdell's conception of law was a
concomitant set of pedagogical practices that included the Socratic
method and the legal casebook.
Langdell declared and believed that "law is a science."84 He
maintained "that all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books."85 More specifically, he saw judicial
opinions as the "'specimens' from which general principles should
be induced."86 Langdell thus "assembled a representative set of court
decisions to create the first legal casebook."87 In addition, "[t]o
ensure that class time was used productively, he introduced the
question-and-answer format now called the Socratic method."88
Carrie Menkel-Meadow
recently
summarized
several
overlapping elements of the Langdellian revolution, which combined
to make the new "scientific" approach more appealing and successful
than the prior method for teaching law had been:
Treating law (as a field) as a science of principles
learned by induction through reading cases and
systematically arranging their holdings into a coherent body
of limited, general principles;...
Using this so-called "Socratic method" to encourage a
certain form of rigorous thinking, designed to sort the
relevant from the irrelevant (in facts), to whittle out the
necessary and sufficient holding (which became the rule of
the case) from the superfluous and unnecessary dicta, and to
state with efficiency and parsimony the ratio decidendi of
the case;
Facilitating the teaching of many students in one
classroom (with remarkably uniform architecture for over a
century), which ultimately turned out to be profitable for
law schools and universities, if not ideal for learning;
84. C. C. Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887).
85. Id.
86. David A. Garvin, Making the Case Professional Education for the World of Practice,
HARVARD MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2003, http://harvardmagazine.com/2003/09/making-the-case.htm.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Developing the modem "casebook" (the collection of
key cases from the common law in the classic, mostly
private law, subjects) from which the "principles of law"
were to be derived by students with little textual
explanation (and the virtual elimination of didactic
lectures);...
Placing legal professional training in the university, as
graduate training, and removed from total control by the
profession (leading to ongoing debates and tensions
between academic and professional conceptions of the
purposes of legal education);
Developing a relatively uniform system of legal
education, eventually established on a national basis (with
"national," rather than state, law being taught), as Harvard
educated academic lawyers disproportionately became law
professors and adopted the Langdellian method throughout
the country.89
Menkel-Meadow's list helps to highlight the fact that the
pedagogical styles and methods ushered in by Langdell and the
formalists created some deep channels from which significant
deviations would be difficult.9" The parts give strength to the whole,
and the whole, to the parts. To be sure, most law students-and,
indeed, most law professors-have long presumed that the case
method, and the hefty casebooks that go with it, is the best means of
teaching law students about the law. After all, if they believed
otherwise, many would have abandoned it or instituted pedagogical
reforms or refinements during the last century or so. But individual
professors seem as committed as ever to their casebooks, and lasting
reforms have been few and slight. Curricular homeostasis has been
the rule. As Nicolas Zeppos recently put it, "I know of no other
university department that uses the same pedagogic approach that it
89. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 561-63 (citations omitted).
90. That is true in part because, together, they became associated with "legal education" and
the traditions and practices that we think of when we think of "law school." They have been
naturalized and are often perceived as if handed down from some greater authority. As social
psychologists have shown, such practices are rarely challenged. See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha
Minow, A Casefor Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REv. 597, 599 (2007) (wondering if
"perhaps the [case] method's survival just resembles the endurance of certain religious traditions
that, once embedded in custom and experience, give rise to new rationales when the old ones fade
away") (citation omitted).
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did 100 years ago, or bases its first year of education on largely the
same basic conceptual categories."91 Presumably, therefore, what
"is" also "ought to be."
Although that remains the general presumption, it has been
successfully rebutted by scholars who have painstakingly studied
legal education. The case method, it seems, is not the manifestation
of a well-functioning marketplace of pedagogical options in which
practices are determined by careful, thoughtful, rational, individual
and collective choices. As Minow and Rakoff write, "Remarkable as
such endurance may be, survival is not . . . the best test of an
educational curriculum."92 Subsequent sections will highlight some
of the case method's significant drawbacks.93 For now, our focus
will be on how the case method's "success" is better understood as
yet another example of a situational character. It is, like a ball, an
artifact of hard-to-see situational forces. And those forces seem
unlikely to yield an ideal system for educating students about laws,
legal institutions, and policymaking, and furthermore, are certain to
downplay situationist accounts of law and policy.
For a glimpse of those situational forces, consider some of the
reasons why the Langdellian approach took hold at the outset. To
begin with, a key advantage of the formalist position was that it
provided the illusion that the law was its own special authority-an
authority that could be discerned only through a new and distinctive
educational process. Of course, the formalists' claims would be
falsified and abandoned by most legal scholars soon enough.94
Nonetheless, Langdell's claims were a boon to the idea of "law
school" generally and to the success of Harvard Law School in
particular. Langdell's scientific pretensions were keys in paving the
way for incorporating a law school at the new research universities.
John Henry Schlegel writes:
The [legal academic] profession as we know it today was
created at about the same time as the rest of the university
disciplines-the late nineteenth and early twentieth
91. Nicholas S.Zeppos, 2007 Symposium on the Future of Legal Education, 60 VAND. L.
REv. 325, 328 (2006).
92. Rakoff& Minow, supra note 90, at 600.
93. See infra Parts IV and V (discussing and outlining several criticisms of, and alternatives
to, curricular conventions in law school).
94. See infra note 108.
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centuries. Significantly, this was at about the same time the
current curricular structure fell into place. As part of this
collective exercise of academic product differentiation, the
law professors chose (or were left with, because no one else
wanted) the rules of law as their separate special subject
matter and "thinking like a lawyer" as their separate special
method.95
Thus, in addition to brushing on a patina of legitimating
scientism, the Langdellian "revolution" in 1870 provided a simple,
dispositionist way of thinking about and teaching law that
distinguished law from other fields and that helped justify and
promote the existence of the "law professor" and the "law school."9 6
Such advantages were furthered through the use of the case
method and casebook, which permitted Langdell to claim that he was
providing a window into a national common law and thus to attract
and justify teaching students from jurisdictions around the country.97
The success of the idea reflected, not its accuracy or realism, but its
consequences: formalist claims and methods helped to create a
constituency that would have a stake in promoting the idea.
The advantages of the case method accrued also to teachers,
because it provided a relatively easy teaching method, particularly
for new professors. Indeed, Langdell himself wrote at the time that a
major motive for developing the case method was his own need to
concoct a method for teaching not one or even a handful, but a
roomful of law students: "I was expected to take a large class of
pupils, meet them regularly from day to day, and give them
systematic instruction in such branches of law as had been assigned
95. John Henry Schlegel, A Damn Hard Thing to Do, 60 VAND. L. REV. 371, 374-75
(2007).
96. Cf. Rakoff& Minow, supra note 90, at 597-98.
What is it in the design of Langdell's case method that gave it such staying power?
We think the answer-or at least a good part of the answer-lies in the fact that it was
constructed to address simultaneously several different questions, each of which must
be answered for a professional school curriculum to succeed with all of its
constituencies and in all of its domains. The Langdellian case method afforded a way
to communicate information, to cultivate a style of reasoning and questioning that was
intellectually respectable, yet also well-suited to the paradigmatic law practice of
adjudication, and to engage the attention and interests of large numbers of students at
relatively little expense for instruction and materials.
Id.
97. See Robert W. Gordon, The Geological Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 339, 341 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Geological Strata].
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to me."98 As Bob Gordon explains, "Law professors rarely emerged
from a background of scholarship; yet the casebooks ensured that
they did not need to know their subject well-either to be learned in
its literature or to be an expert in the principles underlying it-to
make a successful start as a case law teacher."99 Relatedly, the case
method's appeal (and longevity) partially reflects the fact that it
provides closure regarding a number of difficult questions that would
otherwise need to be renegotiated for each teacher:
The strength of his case method lies not in the
irrefutability of any of its elements, but in the way it
plausibly links together the answers to so many questions.
What is there to know? The law consists of a limited
number of principles or doctrines. How are we to know
them? From systematic organization of the way they are
embodied in cases. How will we teach them? By
discussing the cases to see what they embody, and by
applying the principles to hypothetical sets of facts. What
materials will we use? Reports of the cases. Will this be
practical? The reports are in the public domain; we can
provide all the students copies of the cases, collected into
casebooks. Of what use is knowledge of this sort? The
application in this way of principles of this sort, to new
cases, is what lawyers do.' °
In short, "casebooks gave novice teachers a ready-made, off-the-rack
set of teaching materials and method of instruction," and it gave
those materials and methods (and hence the professor who employed
them) legitimacy.'
Not only would the emerging generation of
formalists find a low-cost means of entry into the teaching field, they
would also have a stake in believing and promoting the idea that the
case method was indeed the best way to learn the law." 2 Again, the
98. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 90, at 598 (quoting C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF
CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS v-vii (1871)).
99. Gordon, Geological Strata, supra note 97, at 342.
100. Rakoff& Minow, supra note 90, at 599.
101. Gordon, GeologicalStrata, supra note 97, at 342; see also id. ("Another reason the case
method succeeded was that it proved adaptable to many different approaches to law.").
102. We suspect that the attractiveness of Langdell's classroom and teaching innovations to
teachers (and perhaps students) is that it seems well-suited for making the professor seem
particularly intelligent, in a way that resembles the classic game-show experiment described
above. See supra note 42; Lee D. Ross, Teresa M. Amabile & Julia L. Steinmetz, Social Roles,
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case method succeeded in part because it came ready-made with a
credible team of advocates. 03
The case method contains still other situational effects, which
can be more easily comprehended when one considers how people
process information. As social psychologists have discovered, the
human animal attends especially to those acts or features in its
environs that are particularly salient or that she is primed to see
through her schemas and knowledge structures. °4 The same
tendency is apparent in how legal theorists approach the law. For
instance, the contents of our casebooks are heavily influenced by
what is salient in the law as well as the contents of an editor's
theoretical concepts and categories. One can see the former as a sort
of bottom-up source of attentiveness and the latter as a type of topdown cause of attentiveness. Bob Gordon has captured those
proclivities in his recent discussion of the (situational) forces that
influence curricular change. He explains:
[T]opicality-the salience of a field of law in the world
outside the school, the legal system (especially the courts)
and the profession, politics and the press-is going to force
curricular planners and casebook writers to pay attention to
some subjects, and the lack of topicality will doom other
05
topics to extinction.

Social Control,and Biases in Social-PerceptionProcesses,35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
485,485-94 (1977).
103. See Schlegel, supra note 95, at 375-76.
For the legal academic, the choice of the law school's subject matter and method was
Fat City. First, one got to play judge, always a heady activity for one so far from the
bench. Second, scholarship in the discipline required no messy social science-y
fieldwork. Someone else created the materials for research, and then the postal service
delivered them to the library. Third, one didn't really have to know anything about
what "real lawyers" did all day, which in any case obviously appeared to be mostly a
tedious routine accompanied with the worry that clients might not appear, or if they
appeared, not pay for services rendered. And fourth, even in the early years the
salaries were generous by standards elsewhere in the university system. The only
downside was the need to grade great quantities of exams, a complaint that persists
unabated today.
Id.
104. For a fuller description, see Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 20, at
1178-87.
105. Gordon, Geological Strata,supra note 97, at 365.
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According to Gordon, however, such bottom-up salience "is not
enough to explain how a subject gets into the canon."' °6 Top-down
theories matter too:
Topicality is always naturally filtered through the
perceptual lenses and conceptual preoccupations and
agendas of legal academics. These, it is hardly necessary to
point out, do not always track very closely those of the
practicing profession. In 1900, for example, tort law was
undergoing what one would not exaggerate to call a
revolution; the massive toll of death and injury from
industrial, railroad, and street railroad accidents met up with
an immigrant bar of plaintiffs lawyers, and the result was
the explosion on state court dockets of personal-injury
accident suits. As we have seen, these made virtually no
impression at the time on Ames & Smith, who had other
fish to fry [in their casebook], and plenty of English cases
on intentional torts with which to fry them. Even after
accident law muscled its way into torts books under the
conceptual rubric of negligence, it left out entire fields
employing many practitioners-Federal Employer Liability
Act lawsuits and workers' compensation, to mention only
two. For all tort lawyers and their clients-defendants as
well as plaintiffs-the components and calculation of
damage awards is a matter of brute survival, but this topic
hardly registers in torts books until recent years, because
there is not enough theory about damages to make it
interesting. It becomes interesting when economic thinking
infiltrates legal thinking, because economics reorients the
whole field around the bottom line as the touchstone of
efficient liability rules. °7
Clearly, theory matters. But the changes in theory that can
account for curricular change is a function of still other situational
forces, including how well a new theory can make sense of the cases
and practices that are conventional parts of our legal education
system. Thus, there is another sort of recursive brake that exists
between the case method and intellectual theories-each
106. Id. at 366.
107. Id. (footnote omitted).
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constraining the other. Casebook and classroom methods that were
premised originally on a dispositionist mindset will themselves help
to solidify that mindset which, in turn, will help to reinforce the
underlying casebook method and classroom pedagogy."' 8 Gordon
seems to be hinting at such a process here:
The main entry point for theoretical change is law
teachers' receptivity to outside disciplines, and even
more important, their ability to assimilate them into
conventional ways of legal thinking. Nineteenthcentury jurists successfully re-organized the common
law subjects into substantive-law categories imported
from the modernized Roman Law of the continent.
Twentieth-century jurists in turn converted classical
private-law into instrumental policy analysis by
assimilating the approaches of the "social law"
movements. The Realists' attempt to integrate law
and empirical social science ... were less successful,

though they left permanent traces in the marginaliathe "Materials," notes, and back-of-the-book
Of the
modem
chapters--of casebooks.
interdisciplinary movements, Law and Economics has
made the most impact, partly I think because much of
its style of thinking was already latent, albeit in much
less rigorous form, in the types of policy analysis
bequeathed by social law and legal realism; it gave
lawyers a more rigorous method of doing what they
did already." 9
Outside of the classroom, however, the same situational constraints
do not apply, or at least not to the same degree. Scholars have time
108. Cf Chen & Hanson, CategoricallyBiased, supra note 20, at 1207-11 (describing a more
generalized version of the self-perpetuating features of our knowledge structures); Rakoff &
Minow, supra note 90, at 600-01.
By taking a retrospective view of facts already found and procedures already used by a
court, the appellate decision does little to orient students to the reality of unfolding
problems with facts still to be enacted, client conduct still to take place, and procedural
settings still to be chosen and framed. Of course, teachers fight against these restraintssome more adamantly than others. But it is hard to do so at a deep level. A wellcrafted hypothetical, for example, will alter the facts, but it will not alter the sense that
facts are fixed and known (not to mention fixable and knowable).
Rakoff & Minow, supra note 90, at 600-01.
109. Gordon, GeologicalStrata,supra note 97, at 367.

1388

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 41:1345

to dig deeply into a theory, a case, an area of law, or a hypothesis.
They have the opportunity to develop more situationist arguments
and insights."' Accordingly, there exists a significant disjunction
between what law professors write about in their scholarship and
what and how they teach in the classroom. Gordon explains:
Interdisciplinary approaches have, however, affected
scholarship more than teaching, because traditional
teaching materials, and especially the case method,
continue to act as a brake on innovation .... Torts remains
wedded to cases and the case method partly because its
status as a required first-year course, in a curriculum
committed to using the first year to teach common law
thinking. "'
In those ways, among others," 2 existing methods, conventions, and
expectations are constraining how law professors teach and, in turn,
what law students learn about the law.
Because of the situational advantages of the casebook method, it
has resisted several reform efforts that might have made law school
pedagogy far more situationist than it currently is. Professor
Menkel-Meadow recently described the efforts of Legal Realists in
the early decades of the twentieth century to foster such reforms:
The Realists at Columbia sought to reframe the first year of
law school to study social problems and not only arid
categories of private law. They were also interested in the
social structure which both formed law and affected the
variability of its enforcement and compliance.
Karl Llewellyn, the intellectual founder of Legal
Realism, saw the importance of law in its social context,
with particular processes and particular skills being used to
advance particular social ends. As drafter of the Uniform
Commercial Code, he sought to develop a "realist" body of
law for the operation of commerce as actually practiced by
110. See Benforado & Hanson, Great AttributionalDivide, supra note 80, at 361-62.
111. Gordon, GeologicalStrata,supra note 97, at 367-68.
112. The particular methods and mindsets common to law schools may have acted as a form
of buffer from other parts of the university which have tended to be more situationist. Nicholas
Zeppos, for instance, recently argued that "the self-contained, isolated character of law schools
has allowed them to be resistant to curricular change. Their separation from the general
educational currents of the university has left their teaching program longstanding, not surprising
perhaps given the role of tradition and precedent." Zeppos, supranote 91, at 327-28.
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those who bought and sold goods. As a teacher, he told
students they needed both theory and skills to do their
work.
For the Realists, law was in constant flux and was not
comprised of more or less static "concepts," as the
Formalists (Langdellians) saw it. Law was seen as a means
to accomplish the larger society's goals and was not an end
in itself...
. .. For some, like [Roscoe] Pound, Legal Realism
entailed the sociological and political study of interest
groups that made the law, thus broadening the study of law
outside the sphere of courts and judges. Others, like Jerome
Frank, sought to humanize the study of law by seeing that
judges were human beings and thus subject to social,
political, and psychological pressures that affected how
they interpreted law and resolved disputes. This was legal
humanism with social psychology and sociology.
Realists were skeptical of rules and overly abstracted
concepts. They added "materials" to the study of cases and
hoped to have students study the real world that rules were
supposed to regulate. They believed that with the right
tools of analysis (and teaching) new rules and legal
processes could be developed to respond to and ameliorate
particular social problems, such as crime, inefficient or
defective business and consumer relations, economic
inequalities, unemployment, accidents, injuries, and
poverty. They were interested in both public and private
responsibilities for social problems, and, with the New
Deal, many of them helped launch the great experiments of
the administrative state that became the alphabet agencies.
Law was no longer a "science" of inductive rules or
principles but a "social science" of data gathering and rulestinkering, modifiable legislation, and public regulation.
Law was seen as the dependent variable, society the
independent variable, and analysis and evaluation of
variability was considered possible and desirable. The idea
was to study law as it actually was "in action," not just "in
the books," with the hope that "creative legal thought will
more and more look behind the pretty array of 'correct
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cases' to the actual facts of judicial behavior, will make
increasing use of statistical methods in the scientific
description and prediction of judicial behavior, will more
and more seek to map the hidden springs of judicial
decision and to weigh the social forces which are
represented on the bench."' 13
As Menkel-Meadow summarizes, "[t]he Legal Realists [thus]
produced a wealth of influential academic work and succeeded in
influencing policymakers' and jurists' attitudes towards the New
Deal . . "114 As dramatic as those successes were, they had
surprisingly little impact on legal education.1"5 Again, that is true in
113. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 564-66 (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. at 566. It is possible to give Legal Realists too much credit for legal changes. Our
sense is that the Legal Realists reflected larger shifts as much as or more than they caused themthough we agree that they did indeed play an important causal role.
115. See id. at 567 ("Legal Realism did little to change the structure [or performance] of legal
education .. ").Some twentieth century schools of thought, such as Legal Realism and Critical
Legal Studies ("CLS"), have operated very much outside the Langdellian box and have turned the
formalists' premises more or less upside down, without altering the way law is taught. According
to Professors Rakoff and Minow,
If ...one ceases to believe that the law consists of principles or doctrines, one might
still use cases to teach one's alternative formulation so long as one still cares about
working from the particular to the general and back again, in a practical way with a
large class, because one thinks this mirrors what lawyers do in practice. This, it seems
to us, helps explain why the Realist critique of "law as a science" did not obliterate the
case method in law schools; indeed, in many ways the movement just further
entrenched it.
Rakoff & Minow, A Casefor Another Case Method, supra note 90, at 599.
In the 1970s, proponents of CLS went even further than the Realists had in challenging
traditional jurisprudential positions. They demonstrated the "radical indeterminacy of legal
doctrine," and argued that decisions endorsing one legal doctrine over another could be seen, not
as inevitable, but as a social and cultural privileging of one position over another. See Gary
Minda, Jurisprudenceat Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 39-44 (1993).
In the classroom, though, CLS had surprisingly little impact. In a 1989 article, Professor
Robert Gordon summarized conventional CLS teaching techniques. Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Studies as a Teaching Method, Against the Background of the Intellectual Politics of
Modern Legal Education in the United States, 1 LEGAL EDUC. REv. 59, 76 (1989). His article
explained that a CLS teacher often begins class by "making an inventory of [the] conventional
argumentative moves" of her discipline, and then presenting "them in opposing pairs." Id. at 7778. By way of illustration, he pointed to arguments for formality (rules) versus arguments for
informality (standards). See id. The CLS-inspired professor would then do the same with
oppositional policy arguments, until, as Gordon described, "it becomes relatively simple, when a
court or a student ...makes one of the conventional doctrinal arguments, to elicit from the class
the conventional counter-arguments," and thus to show how these arguments are selectively
deployed to support one or another legal result. Id. at 78. Arguably, this CLS method did more
to hone students' skills at manipulating arguments than to provide situational context with which
to better understand and analyze individual policy questions. Gordon conceded that a refined
demonstration of the indeterminacy and contradiction of doctrinal and policy arguments "could
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part because of the classroom advantages created by the
dispositionist approach to law, including the case method and
traditional casebook. Strikingly, the methods of teaching seem to
have constrained law professors from teaching law as they
themselves understand it." 6
Bob Gordon similarly highlights that effect in his recent history
of pedagogical methods in law school. From the beginning,
according to Gordon, the "diffusion of casebooks and case method
teaching" played an important role in promoting Langdell's
dispositionist "'pure law' private-law curriculum" and in squashing
"the public-law, interdisciplinary, and theoretical approaches of
Harvard's chief rivals.""' 7 Then, in the later years of the nineteenth
century,
innovators at American schools continued to look to Europe
for curricular inspiration. The models were largely German
(and sometimes French) schools of public administration.
When Woodrow Wilson was asked to design a new law
school for Princeton in 1890, he rejected the Harvard
template, wanting "not a duplicate of those [law schools]
already in full blast all over the country, but an institutional
law school, so to speak, in which law shall be taught in its
historical and philosophical aspects, critically rather than
teach [students] that since the system provides no right answers, they will be justified in making
as much money as they can pushing whatever arguments benefit the client of the moment." Id. at
80.
116. That touches another factor that may help to explain why conventional practices are what
they are. We suspect that somewhere subconsciously most law professors have accepted those
practices in part because they have been taught and have accepted that there is something "realworldish" about teaching law as they do. Of course, as many critics have emphasized, there are
numerous ways in which the common-law curriculum of the first year is not really so realworldish, and a meaningful commitment to giving students the knowledge and skills they most
need would lead to dramatic transformation of existing practices. Still, there seems to be
something about the current approach that many legal academics consider to be a necessary
component of the process of learning to "think like a lawyer." Although it is hard to put one's
finger on exactly what is so realistic about the conventional approach, we suspect that part of it is
an unspoken shared sense that law professors must teach students to operate within the fagade of
formalism and with the language of dispositionism that still dominates lay understandings of our
legal system. The real world requires, in other words, that lawyers abide by strict rules that help
to keep up appearances of the system. Teaching students to act as if the law has a disposition and
authority of its own, that case law is and should be binding as precedent, that the answers to legal
disputes can be gleaned simply from understanding the essence of an area of law, and so on, is
integral to maintaining the legitimacy and authority of our system. If true, such a practice may be
a good thing or a bad thing, depending upon one's view of the status quo.
117. Gordon, Geological Strata, supra note 97, at 342.
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technically, and as if it had a literature besides a court
record, close institutional connections as well as litigious
niceties,-as it is taught in the better European
universities."
The Princeton school's first chair was to be in public
law, which included Constitutional Law, Administrative
Law, International Law, General Jurisprudence, History of
Law, History of Legal Philosophy, Public Corporations, and
8
Conflict of Laws."1
Princeton's law school has yet to materialize. But the desire for an
alternative approach more like the one Wilson championed (that is, a
relatively situationist approach) has lived on. With the rise of Legal
Realism and other progressive intellectual movements in the early
twentieth century, legal theory and legal pedagogy both would face
new criticisms and reforms. Duncan Kennedy has described portions
of the shift as follows:
The inventors of the "social" include Jhering, Ehrlich,
Gierke, Geny, Saleilles, Duguit, Lambert, Josserand,
Gounot, Gurvitch, Pound, and Cardozo. They had in
common with the Marxists that they interpreted the actual
regime of the will theory [the individualist (or
dispositionist) basis of "formalist" or "Classical" legal
thought, that private law is designed to help individuals
realize their freely-willed ends] as an epiphenomenon in
relation to a "base," in the case of the Marxists, the
capitalist economy, and in the case of the social, "society"
conceived as an organism. The idea of both was that the
will theory in some sense "suited" the socio-economic
conditions of the first half of the nineteenth century. But
the social people were anti-Marxist, just as much as they
were anti-laissez faire. Their goal was to save Liberalism
from itself.
Their basic idea was that the conditions of late
nineteenth-century life represented a social transformation,
consisting of urbanization, industrialization, organizational
society, globalization of markets, all summarized in the idea
of "interdependence."
Because the will theory was
118. Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
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individualist, it ignored interdependence and endorsed
particular legal rules that permitted anti-social behavior of
many kinds. The crises of the modem factory (industrial
accidents) and the urban slum (pauperization), and later the
crisis of the financial markets, all derived from the failure
of coherently individualist law to respond to the coherently
social needs of modem conditions of interdependence. 119
The new thinking, Gordon explains, certainly had an impact on
policy:
Progressive reformers

.

.

were beginning to initiate

statutory reforms in the service of social law visions:
factory inspection, food and drug regulation, maximum
hours labor laws, workers' compensation systems, railroad
rate regulation, child labor abolition, resource conservation
planning, public health regimes, "purity" crusades against
the polluting effects of vice, alcohol and obscenity,
progressive taxation of income, and many more. These
reform efforts involved enacting new statutes, setting up
new administrative agencies to administer them, and
litigating to repel Constitutional challenges to the new
statutes and judicial evisceration of regulatory regimes.
All these new intellectual approaches and concrete
reform activities created large bodies of new law outside
the Harvard canon of traditional subjects and raised
questions of how or whether law schools, which for prestige
reasons were one after another converting to the Harvard
model, would be prepared to take them on board. 2 '
Nonetheless, Gordon's history shows how the Harvard model
resisted the new theory and new laws in the classroom-jettisoning
those individuals who sought to bring it aboard as potentially
contaminating.
Ironically then, just as Progressivism was beginning to
provide careers and motivation for "social" lawyers,

. . .

the

law schools were seized by internal reform movements that
119. Gordon, Geological Strata, supra note 97, at 345 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, The
Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber's Sociology in the
Genealogy of the ContemporaryMode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 1031, 103435 (2004)).
120. Gordon, Geological Strata, supra note 97, at 346.
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sought to expel or exclude all of those ideas as irrelevant to
the study of "pure law." By 1920, policy studies in law
schools were even more peripheral than they had been in
1870, having been driven out by the Langdellian privatelaw case method curriculum. For as the Harvard model
proliferated, it exiled or marginalized both the traditional
and the newer (Progressive) alternative curricula, sending
them off to separate departments or confining them to the
law schools' graduate programs. What the Harvard model
tended to drive out was not only almost anything that
smacked of public law (legislation or administration, law as
part of a framework of government, international law), but
also legal theory and jurisprudence, as well as anything that
provided overviews, perspectives, or comparisons about
law-courses in the "elements of law," Roman law,
comparative law, legal history, or the sociology of legal
institutions or law-in-action.'21
So why was the Harvard faculty so averse to a more situationist
approach to law and legal teaching? According to Gordon, the
answer, tempting as it may be to give, is not that Harvard professors
"were parochial and anti-intellectual philistines who thought
anything that was not black-letter law must be bunk."'2 Nor were
they "conservatives defending classical-individualist-private-law will
theory from Progressive social lawyers."'23 No, their "single-minded
reductionism of the Harvard missionaries" was a reflection of the
fact that "[t]he canonical curriculum and its casebooks ...

were the

product of a transatlantic collaboration with English analytical jurists
.. who were determined to construct from the ruins of the
collapsing forms of action a coherent science of substantive
principles."' 24 Gordon explains:
in an age of specialization, [those scholars] were trying to
establish law as a distinctive discipline and autonomous
technical subject that was different from everything else in
the academy.
The study of public law inevitably

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
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adulterated pure law with political science, economics, and
history, and was thus to be avoided. Also, the public law
subjects were politically controversial-professors could be
fired for taking positions on railroad regulation, the "trust"
problem, labor relations, or progressive taxation-issues the
alumni and trustees thought too left-wing.'25
In other words, even if the scholars were not hard-core
dispositionists themselves, their situation required that they behave
(and teach law) as if they were.
There is, according to Gordon, a still more important
explanation. The stickiness of the Langdellian model reflected the
faith and fervor of law professors at the time in the pedagogical
methods that the Langdellian revolution wrought:
[M]ostly, I think, Harvard's missionaries and epigones
pushed for their constricted curriculum simply because they
had become fanatically committed to the case method of
teaching law students as a uniquely rigorous and effective
method . . . . The case method was just not suited to
teaching about statutes or administrative agency actions
(except as these might appear piecemeal in a case), or about
the economics of rate-making or antitrust regulation, or
about courts in relation to other governmental institutions,
or empirical studies of law-in-action, or comparative,
historical or theoretical perspectives on law.'26
Against the progressive onslaught, the law school curriculum
remained surprisingly dispositionist, then, mostly because the
teaching methods in place were too appealing to sacrifice.'27 The
case method was the hammer, and cases were perfect nails. As
twentieth century scholars discovered that laws and legal theory
required drilling, sawing, planing, sanding, and finishing, they
nonetheless clung to their favorite tool and excluded their discoveries
in the classroom.

125. Id. at 348-49.
126. Id. at 349.
127. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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C. Summary

In those ways, the case method has been part of the situation that
has constrained our willingness to try alternatives and that has
influenced what we teach, learn, and "know" about the law. We
exist in a situation where mostly everyone accepts the fundamental
anti-formalist insights of Legal Realism, and yet the case method
reflects the thinking of the formalists. 2 ' That is the way we are
training our new lawyers. And that is the way our students expect to
be taughtl: 9 -an expectation that further entrenches conventional
practices.'3
128. To be clear, we are not claiming that law professors blindly accept the judicial reasoning
contained in the cases they teach. Certainly they do not. Indeed, "teaching against" a casebook
not only is common, but also has a long history dating back to the Legal Realists. See Gordon,
Geological Strata, supra note 97, at 342 (explaining how the Realists would often use "cases
largely as storehouses of facts about disputes and treated the actual opinions (except for those of a
handful of judge-heroes) as examples of unsatisfactory formalist analysis, prompting the students
to craft context- and policy-based rationales that would provide better bases for decisions").
Nonetheless, the cases themselves provide the anchor to which analysis is tethered. A professor
might challenge a factual claim supporting one conclusion about how a particular case should
come out with a different factual claim supporting a different conclusion about how that case
should have been decided. There is no careful, extensive examination of the larger situation or
policies supporting it. And there is no opportunity, given the number of cases that must be
covered, and the limited resources available in a semester, to provide a significant situationist
challenge to the dispositionist presumption. Cfid. at 367 (explaining that the Legal Realists did
leave their mark in the casebooks); Schlegel, supra note 95, at 375 (describing the method of
offering small amounts of criticism, but nothing more).
129. Our casebooks are reinforcing the cultural stereotypes and expectations about what law
school is like (as reflected, for instance, in movies such as The Paper Chase, Legally Blonde, Soul
Man, and The Firm) at the same time that those stereotypes are reinforcing the Langdellian
model. Descriptive stereotypes wield a prescriptive punch in the classroom. As most law
professors who have noticeably drifted from the law school script can attest, it is difficult to teach
1Ls in a way that deviates significantly from Scott Turow's One L without students feeling that
they are being deprived of the only authentic path to becoming a lawyer. See, e.g., PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 25-32 (1991) (recounting student's negative
reaction to her efforts to include critical theories in her first-year contract law course).
Disabusing law students of their expectations or of the normative significance of those
expectations is no easy task. Although students go their entire lives leaming without the aid of
casebooks or the Socratic method, in law school they suddenly become Langdellian zealots. It is
their proof to themselves-and perhaps law schools' proof to the world-that a layperson is
becoming a "lawyer."
The fact that most law professors take part in this cycle further ossifies it. Law
professors are not only teaching law, they are implicitly teaching students about the role of law
and lawyers. Kathryn Stanchi explains:
As legal educators, our pedagogical and curricular choices telegraph to our students
what we think it means to be a lawyer. Right now, we mostly have courses that teach
doctrine (largely by the case method), a few courses that teach skills (like legal
research and writing and clinicals), and some courses in legal theory, with only modest
overlap between them. Moreover, courses that teach skills and those that teach critical
legal theory are rather marginalized. What this telegraphs is that learning to crunch
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And, so, the hammer of law school continues to swing. 131 In the
words of Harvard Law Professors Todd Rakoff and Martha Minow:
The plain fact is that American legal education, and
especially its formative first year, remains remarkably
similar to the curriculum invented at the Harvard Law
School by Christopher Columbus Langdell over a century
and a quarter ago. Invented, that is, not just before the
Internet, but before the telephone; not just before man
reached the moon, but before he reached the North Pole;
cases is paramount; lawyering skills are somehow separate from this (and less
important); and learning legal theory--especially critical legal theory-is a somewhat
esoteric endeavor divorced from both doctrine and the practice of law.
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Step Away from the Case Book: A Callfor Balance and Integration in Law
School Pedagogy,43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 611, 611 (2008).
130. As already noted, professors dissatisfied with the current approach are deterred by the
significant burdens of developing a set of materials that goes beyond an edited set of familiar
appellate cases organized around a familiar doctrinal structure. But we have just glimpsed
another source of strength for the status quo. With virtually every course embracing the
conventional casebook method and confirming mutual expectations across faculty members and
between students and professors, it is extremely difficult for one professor to significantly depart
from the established path. One might imagine an alternative universe in which a very different
sort of legal pedagogy was the norm, and in which professors, students, and the world were a
better place for it. The remaining problem is in how to bridge those universes. To an individual
professor, the costs of developing a new approach are prohibitive, even if the benefits to many
professors and students would greatly exceed those costs. Overcoming that public-good or
collective-good quality is unlikely in a setting where pedagogical reform tends to take place one
professor at a time (and, hence, rarely and barely at all). That understates the magnitude of the
challenge because a collective illusion may keep individual professors from recognizing the
potential collective benefits of a new approach. (If an individual professor believes that a novel
approach might be employed by other professors in their classes, then that professor would likely
be more willing to invest in creating the materials.) This bias for the status quo is related to a
fairly common effect that social psychologists call pluralisticignorance. The phenomenon is alltoo familiar in the law school classroom: when, for instance, a professor asks a deeply confused
class if there are any questions, and every student remains silent (in the false belief that their
bewilderment is unique), the professor moves forward as if he or she had been perfectly clear.
Presuming that the group marches forward for good reasons, we go along, even though each of us
may tread in ignorance. See Jon Hanson & Goutan Jois, Can't Get No Satisfaction, HARV. L.
REC., Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://media.www.hlrecord.org/media/storage/paper609/
news/2006/10/19/Opinion/Cant-Get.No.Satisfaction-2377324.shtml. Similarly, if the supposition
is that the conventional case method is the method as measured in part by the fact that it is the
method that everyone employs, that supposition will discourage innovation, even when such
innovation might prove beneficial. Furthermore, even were such innovations attempted, few
professors may be willing to give them a try in light of the costs of retooling for a course coupled
with the fact that existing practices carry their own normative force regarding how all law
professors should teach. Finally, even if many can agree that the current system has problems,
one single alternative approach is unlikely to generate or enjoy a consensus. The status quo is
advantaged because the default wins when the challenger fails to muster sufficient support; again,
what "is" eclipses "what ought to be."
13 1. That is true, of course, moreso in the first-year lecture hall than at the third-year seminar
table.
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not just before Foucault, but before Freud; not just before
Brown v. Board of Education, but before Plessy v.
Ferguson. There have been modifications, of course; but
American legal education
has been an astonishingly stable
32
practice.
cultural
One conclusion that we draw from all of this is that the legal
academy is overdue for a new form of teaching tort law and a new
type of casebook that would yield a more situationist approach and
understanding. The next section briefly sketches a situationist
alternative; it takes a first cut at imagining what a situationist torts
book might look like. The following section then examines some of
the reasons why despite a long history of immutability, the time
might finally be right for the dispositionist case method to yield to a
133
situationist alternative.
IV.

SITUATIONIST TORTS CASEBOOK

In this section we want to briefly describe a few basics and
answer a few common questions about the kind of torts casebook
that might more effectively incorporate situationism.
Although no two torts casebooks are exactly alike,'34 most have
a great deal in common. That assertion was confirmed in Professor
Gordon's recent inventory. He found that the vast majority of torts
casebooks over the last century shared many features in common.131
He also discovered, however, "[t]wo outliers whose schemata do not
quite fit the regular pattern."' 36 From our perspective, the interesting
132. Rakoff& Minow, supra note 90, at 597 (footnote omitted).
133. In Part V, infra, we offer some reasons for cautious optimism regarding the ripeness of a
situationist alternative.
134. Casebooks differ in several ways. Perhaps most obvious, they frequently cover different
topics. Richard A. Epstein's Cases and Materials on Torts, for example, includes sections on
subjects that are usually not covered in first-year torts courses, such as defamation and tort
immunities. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (8th ed.
2004) (also employing basic economic concepts). Dan B. Dobbs and Paul T. Hayden's casebook
examines non-tort systems of compensation, including social security and workers'
compensation. See generally DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (5th ed. 2005). Some
torts casebooks also incorporate other academic disciplines. See generally DOMINICK R. VETRI,
LAWRENCE C. LEVINE, JOAN VOGEL & LUCINDA FINLEY, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed.

2003) (utilizing anthropology to illuminate tort law); see also Anthony J. Sebok, Using
Comparative Torts Materials to Teach First-Year Torts, 57 J. L. ED. 562 (2007) (making a good

case for supplementing traditional torts casebooks with comparative materials).
135. Gordon, GeologicalStrata,supra note 97, at 361-65.

136. Id. at 363.
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feature common to the outliers was their relatively situationist
approach. The first was John Henry Wigmore's Torts casebook of
1912:
Most striking about this book is its explicitly theoretical
plan of organization, its extensive use of non-case materials
(many excerpts from such writers as Machiavelli, Herbert
Spencer, Burke, Brougham, Lieber, Bentham, Macaulay,
Tocqueville), its attention to comparative law, and its
treatment of statutory materials as on par with common law
as a proper subject of legal theory. Wigmore, in short,
organizes the field by generalizing the broad policies served
by the rules.
Legal education, I think, would have
developed very differently had it evolved along the paths
blazed by Wigmore 37
The second was Leon Green's casebook of 1939:
After a brief introductory chapter on general concepts,
Green breaks the field down into contexts and relations:
"Threats, Insults, Blows, etc.;" "Physicians, Surgeons,
Hospitals;" "Occupancy and Ownership of Land;" "Public
Service Companies;" "Counties, Towns, Cities, Boards;"
"Manufacturers,
Dealers;"
"Traffic
and Transport
[subdivided in turn into Railway, Auto, Passengers, etc.]"
This approach had the great virtue of encouraging the
reader-student to appreciate the importance of social
context to applications of law. But unlike Wigmore, it did
not give the student the resources to make comparisons of
policies across contexts or to identify larger background
38
factors at work.'
Gordon mentioned those exceptions for the same reason that we will:
"[T]hey illustrate some roads not taken.' 1 39 In our view, a return to
those roads would constitute an important first step in imagining
what a situationist torts book might look like.

137. Gordon, Geological Strata,supra note 97, at 363.
138. Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id.
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A. Casebook or Guidebook? Dictionary
or Encyclopedia?
Before saying more on that topic, it is useful to discuss the
characteristics shared by those high-traffic casebooks. For starters,
they usually include many cases and even more squib notes that
discuss how each case relates to, or establishes, a "rule," and how
that rule may vary across jurisdictions. 4 ' The doctrinal categories
are widely shared as are many of the cases employed to illustrate
those doctrines. Discussions of why a particular decision was
rendered are often brief and straightforward, sometimes containing
context-free motivations, such as how the decision advances
"economic efficiency" or bright-line predictability. Seldom do the
books furnish the socio-economic backgrounds of the plaintiff,
defendant, or judge.14 ' Even less common is a description of the
party's communities or the influence of larger forces, such as social
norms, prejudices, technologies, or ideologies, on the facts giving
rise to the case or on the judge's decision.' More or less, they take
the opinions as they find them and largely accept the judges' edited
account of what happened and what mattered.
Sometimes, in the notes following the cases of the standard
casebook, there will be citations to law review articles that provide a
hint of situation-for instance, the notes may include some historical
detail or sociological context. Occasionally, even a quote containing
an intriguing or surprising twist from such an article will be included.
But those references and brief excerpts are usually the extent of any
context and subtext. And, yet, when one reads the entirety of the
article excerpted, one's impressions of what "really happened" in the
case are often transformed.
It is hard not to get the feeling from this basic setup that law
professors are supposed to teach torts as if what "really happened" is
unimportant-as if reading a case is like watching an inspired-by-atrue-story movie in which the movie is to be judged on its own terms.
140. Our review of available torts casebooks revealed that these books generally include
between 140 and 170 principal cases, the vast majority of which are significantly edited.
141. VETRI, LEVINE, VOGEL & FINLEY supra note 134, is a notable exception. For another
partial exception, see JAMES A. HENDERSON JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON, DOUGLAS A. KYSAR &

JOHN A. SILICIANO, THE TORTS PROCESS 155-57 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the relevance of
behavioral law and economics in assessing the influence of a judge's characteristics, such as
political partisanship, race, gender, and class, on judicial decision-making).
142. Again, there are exceptions. See VETRI, LEVINE, VOGEL & FINLEY supra note 134.
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Why should that be the approach? Why shouldn't the focus be on
the underlying story, rather than on the Hollywood version?
After all, even for the most practical among law teachers, the
attorneys who we are training our students to become will always be
dealing in real cases, not movies. There is, it seems to us, much to
be gained by aspiring lawyers: first, studying the story behind the
case; second, learning how real cases are transformed into legal
opinions; and third, examining the consequences of those opinions.
Put differently, there is much to be gained by looking beyond the
appellate-case fact patterns and the doctrinal categories, schemas,
and maneuvers that most of us think of when we think of "law" and
"casebooks."
An analogy, somewhat forced, might be helpful. Think of tort
law as a first-year student might-a foreign country with its own
language, customs, practices, and history. Now envision that country
as you might any country-mapped into a variety of regions and
cities, occupied by a diverse population, governed through a
somewhat complex political system over which various groups
compete. Imagine, then, tort law as a nation, not fully independent,
but linked and related to still other foreign countries with
overlapping histories and languages, politics, interests, and
populations.
Actually, that is not the forced part of the analogy. That's
coming next.
The standard torts casebook is, for the new student traveler,
much like a foreign-language dictionary. Each case with its holding
and squib with its qualification is like a word in a dictionary with its
primary and alternative definitions. No doubt, such a book is a
valuable item to pack and carry along on such a journey. Certainly,
it could prove vital for survival as one attempts to negotiate this
unfamiliar landscape.

43

Unfortunately, beyond a select lexicon of words and
expressions, the foreign-language dictionary does not provide the
student much understanding of the foreign country. Indeed, at its
core, it is a collection of words which might be taught one-by-one
and which the student might eventually use to form sentences and
143. According to Magellan's Travel Supplies, one of the top ten essentials for foreign
travelers is a foreign-language dictionary. See Paula Crouch Thrasher, Going Places, ATL. J.
CONST., Apr. 18, 1999, at 4K (citing Magellan's list).
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gain the ability to communicate basic requests and commands:
"Where is the bathroom?"; "The car is broken."; "A plaintiff has the
burden of proving four elements"; "There are three types of
comparative negligence"; and so on. Certainly, there is valuable
knowledge contained in a foreign-language dictionary, but one can
learn a great deal more through more immersive and holistic
instruction.
A situationist torts casebook would feel more like a guidebook
for, or an encyclopedic entry about, the foreign country. A volume
that teaches about the origins, history, geography, customs,
government, foreign relations, economics, demographics, religions,
culture, and so on strikes us extraordinarily valuable for the young
traveler. Such a book would provide a very different kind of
understanding of the foreign land-indeed, a more useful and
accurate one-than does a language dictionary.
As that metaphor is meant to suggest, the situationist approach
would represent a significant departure from the conventional
approach. Such a casebook would not simply be an alternative to, it
would also be a challenge to, the largely dispositionist model of tort
law and tort theory implicit in most torts casebooks. A situationist
torts book would take a different view of the law and the people
subject to it. It would employ a model of the human animal
informed by social-scientific disciplines devoted to understanding
why humans behave as they do, and how humans make sense of
themselves. It would likewise seek to identify the larger situational
forces that (under the headings of simplicity, legitimacy, affirmation,
and power) have shaped tort law, much as they have other areas of
law. Put differently, it would consider tort law to be a situational
character-a tort ball-and study the various forces moving it.
Among other problems with our analogy is that most casebooks,
as noted above, are not completely devoid of travel-guide tips.
Similarly, a situationist torts casebook would include a dictionary of
sorts. 1" Our point is one of emphasis. The typical casebook, or at
least the ones we have spent much time with, are usually heavy on
dictionary and disposition and light on encyclopedia and situation. A
situationist torts casebook would flip that arrangement. Table 1,

144. See infra text accompanying note 145.
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below, adumbrates a sample of the sorts of differences between a
typical dispositionist torts casebook and a situationist casebook.

TABLE 1.
RELATIVELY DIsPOSITIONIST

RELATIVELY SITUATIONIST

PERSPECTIVE

PERSPECTIVE

" premised on dispositional
actor schema
" assumes the person or "model
actor" who is subject to the
law is moved by his or her
disposition
* assumes that actors involved
in creating tort law (that is,
judges) are dispositional
actors
" assumes tort law has a
disposition and is moved by
its own internal forces

0 premised on situational
character schema
9 assumes the person or
"model actor" who is subject
to the law is moved mostly
by his or her situation
e assumes that actors involved
in creating tort law are
situational characters

* views tort law as an
independent actor with
implications just for "torts,"
operating among other
autonomous, if sometimes
overlapping, areas of law
* focuses on tort law's own
purported ends and purposes

*

" assumes tort law and the
principles, concepts, and
categories associated with it
are relatively stable across
situations

*

assumes that tort law is best
understood as a situational
character, moved by
situational forces within and
around us
sees tort law as part of a
fabric of laws that are
mutually constitutive

focuses on larger situational
ends and tort law's
connection to those ends
assumes tort law and the
principles, concepts, and
categories associated with it
are relatively situation
specific
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RELATIVELY DISPOSITIONIST
PERSPECTIVE

RELATIVELY SITUATIONIST
PERSPECTIVE

* assumes tort decisions have
implications only for
individuals involved in
dispute or, perhaps, for others
who might be deterred in
similar situations

.

* reflects and reinforces the
fundamental attribution error
and other motivated
attributions (looks only at
salient individuals and
dispositions for making
attributions)
* promotes goals that are
premised on dispositionism
(e.g., maximizing free choice
and consent)

*

" premised on dispositionist
conceptions and
understandings of other
institutions (e.g., markets,
regulation, other areas of
common law)
* assumes that tort law is best
understood by approaching it
from the inside-from the
perspective of individual
cases or doctrinal categories

*

*

assumes tort decisions have
implications for many
individuals and groups
beyond those involved in
dispute and in ways that go
beyond those imagined in a
typical deterrence story
resists and challenges the
fundamental attribution error
and other motivated
attributions (looks for less
salient situational forces for
making attributions)
doubtful of simplistic
dispositionist goals, focused
on more realistic versions of
those goals as well as on how
outcomes comport with
underlying values and larger
situational ends
premised on the situationist
conceptions and
understandings of other
institutions

assumes that tort law is best
understood by approaching it
from the outside-from the
perspective of the underlying
harm and the situational
forces that do or do not lead
to viable tort claims
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RELATIVELY DISPOSITIONIST
PERSPECTIVE

RELATIVELY SITUATIONIST
PERSPECTIVE

* views doctrine on its own
terms, or infers from the
doctrine an underlying
disposition

*

" assumes that doctrine evolves
from a more or less
independent authority and/or
legitimate process
" confident that participants (or
potential participants) are
equally advantaged in the
torts process

e

* presumes that tort law's
effects are fairly constant or
consistent across individuals
or groups

*

* assumes tort law is relevant
to (and should be focused on)
only the sort of harms that we
associate with tort law (more
or less individualized harms
without regard to the
situation)
* concerned only about salient,
measurable, conventional
forms of harms or damages

*

*

*
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views doctrine as reflecting
naive psychology and social
cognition and many other
internal or external
situational influences
skeptical of the independence
of the authority behind
doctrine and the legitimacy
of the process
concerned about advantages
and disadvantages that
different parties or groups
face in tort law and the
legitimating cover that
process might provide
suspects that tort law's
effects will vary depending
upon the situation of
different individuals or
groups
assumes tort law is relevant
to (and should be focused on)
many social problems (to not
only what counts as a "tort,"
but also what does not count
as a "tort")
concerned also about less
salient, hard-to-measure,
unconventional harms and
damages
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RELATIVELY DIsPOSITIONIST

RELATIVELY SITUATIONIST

PERSPECTIVE

PERSPECTIVE

assumes that tort law should
concern itself with one basic,
dispositionist goal (e.g.,
corrective justice or
deterrence) and should
steadfastly avoid concerns
about other goals (e.g.,
distribution)
* presumes that tort law
"makes sense" and is
normatively desirable or just

a

"

assumes that tort law should
worry less about simplistic
dispositionist goals and more
about situationist goals (e.g.,
distribution of power and
wealth)

presumes that tort law
reflects the interests of those
with the greatest ability to
influence it constrained by
other motives (e.g.,
simplicity, legitimacy,
affirmation, and plausibility)

B. Some FrequentlyAsked Questions

1. What Would a Situationist Torts Casebook
Actually Look Like?
From the outside, a situationist torts casebook would probably
look like the standard torts casebook. It would feature a hardcover
and would weigh in at approximately 1,200 to 1,500 pages. Looking
between the bindings would bring to mind the tired admonition about
judging books and covers. 145

145. Even a cursory glance would reveal pages containing, not just black letters, but also
photographs, images, diagrams, graphs, maps, and other shiny things that might further
distinguish a situationist torts casebook from currently available ones. Along those lines, we
agree with students who complain that many casebooks have as much personality as a
cinderblock. If casebooks do not have to be that way, we are for change. Studies in psychology
and graphic design, among other disciplines, confirm the power of images to teach, while other
studies reveal the limitations to teaching exclusively through written words. See, e.g., Jay Cross,
Sight Mammals: People Learnfrom Images as well as Words, Yet Most of CorporateLearning Is

Delivered in Text, 2 TRAINING & DEV. 47 (2003) (making the case for images); Stuart J.
McKelvie, The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaireas Predictor of Facial Recognition
Memory Performance, 85 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 93 (2004) (explaining power of vivid images).. This

may be even truer of today's students, who do much of their reading on electronic sourcesreplete with images, animations, and videos-than it was of earlier, more "bookish" generations.
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Casebooks generally contain between 140 and 170 cases. 146
Although few torts professors slog through them all, the very
presence of those cases creates some urge to do so-an implicit and,
we think, harmful measure for students and faculty alike of what a
tort class should cover, what pace it should maintain, and what depth
it should reach. Although we are eager to reject that measure, we
remain fans of using cases to teach. The trick would be to switch
from many appellate cases to a smaller number of "case studies,"
each built around one or a few appellate cases. 4 7 A situationist
casebook, then, would include roughly two-dozen appellate cases:
something like six main or anchor cases (each surrounded by a thick
layer of situationist materials), another six secondary cases
(surrounded by only a thin layer of situationist materials), and
another dozen cases (together with pertinent statutes and regulations)
to provide precedential context for that first dozen.
2. Would a Situationist Approach Require More
Reading for Students?
Although the reading-per-case would certainly increase
substantially in a situationist torts casebook, the number of cases
would decline significantly. The net effect of this tradeoff would
vary depending on how much reading a professor customarily
assigns and how many cases and which parts of the material she opts
to assign. Still, we suspect that, on balance, professors who use a
situationist torts casebook would likely demand more reading than
they would from a typical torts casebook.
Keep in mind, however, quantity of pages may not constitute the
most reliable or accurate measure of "reading." Indeed, pages in a
situationist torts casebook would, on average, be lighter and probably
more engaging than the standard fare: instead of numerous cases,
each with its own complexities and squib notes containing dense text
and unanswered (are they unanswerable?) parenthetical questions, a
situationist torts casebook would include histories, legal-theoretic
overviews, relevant newspaper stories and interviews, and briefs all
relating to the same case. Although the number of pages would

146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
147. Cf Rakoff & Minow, supra note 90, at 606 (calling for a switch from the traditional
case-method approach to the case-studies approach used in business schools).
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increase in a situationist
torts casebook, the burden of torts reading
48
would decrease. 1

3. Would It Be Harder to Teach This Way?
As we described in Part III, a major reason for the success of
Langdell's dispositionist approach is that it was easy for professors
to pick up. 49 As we will describe in Part V, below, a situationist
torts casebook may offer scholars an opportunity to teach in a way
that better complements their scholarship. 5
On net, however,
professors would have to make a fairly significant investment to
make the transition.
In several ways, the situationist approach would also change the
classroom experience for teachers and students. To begin with, it
would level the playing field considerably by putting more
information into the basic reading materials around any given case.
Those materials would alter the classroom dynamic and pedagogical
practices. They would reduce the role for the Socratic method and
increase the role for lectures and more participatory and
collaborative approaches, like open discussions, group projects,
student presentations, and more creative pedagogical methods.''
The situationist materials would also create more opportunities and a
greater urge to discuss the notoriously "difficult issues" that torts
professors normally avoid, such as economic inequality, racial
injustice, and so on.

148. Our discussion in the text unrealistically imagines a new kind of casebook without also
imagining a new style of teaching. In fact, we are currently experimenting with new teaching
methods that would, among other things, reduce the amount of total reading that any one student
must complete even as it would increase the amount of reading that the class as whole must
cover. Although this is not the place to detail those experiments, the consequence is that
subgroups within the class are assigned certain roles or perspectives that require them to gain
greater expertise (and thus do more detailed reading) on certain topics than other students do.
Taken together, the class does more reading while the amount of reading per student is reduced.
149. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
150. See infra Part V.B.

151. Of course, there may still be a significant role for the Socractic method. Our point is
simply that the Langdellian link between the case method and Socractic method will be broken,
and that many professors will likely find the Socratic method less appealing than alternative
methods, in light of the nature of the materials. Inasmuch as the new sort of casebook would
reduce professors' reliance on the Socratic method, professors might sacrifice the perceived IQ
boost that that method promotes. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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Transitioning to a situationist casebook could be significantly
lightened with the aid of a helpful teacher's manual. 52 The
significant changes in the materials and, very likely, teaching
methods could be made more tractable with the aid of a detailed and
clear teacher's guide that highlighted key connections in the
materials, provided teaching suggestions for covering certain
materials, and anticipated and offered suggestions for how to respond
to students' common questions or concerns.
A situationist torts manual would, therefore, reflect different
pedagogical ambitions and a far slower pace-something closer to
two-weeks per case. Class preparation for professors would be
different than it has been with conventional casebooks. It would
generally not be enough to read two or three cases for each class and
plod through the semester, one modest step after the other. Instead,
the professor would need to read large chunks of materials with each
new anchor case, and then brush up as necessary on the details of
some of those materials as the class trajectory dictates. Reading the
entire chunk before beginning to discuss the initial portions of it in
class would give the professor a sense of the larger themes and
connections and of the context and situational forces in play. Each
element in a given set of readings, therefore, would be understood
once the entirety of the materials has been reviewed.'53 Recognizing
that a first-time teacher may not always have the opportunity to
familiarize herself with the large chunk of readings before beginning
a new case, the manual would need to provide an executive summary
of the materials in a given section, an assessment of what portions
are most important, and suggestions for how the readings were
intended to unfold.'54 Such a guide would identify the big and small
152. In our experience, casebook teachers' manuals tend to resemble the commercial outlines
or case digests available to students: a summary of the case, a rule, a few quick questions,
followed by (usually) brief versions of the standard answers. Get in, and get out. It is the sort of
guide that can be very useful for a course moving at a Langdellian pace-a three-case per hour
cadence. Again, there are clear exceptions here, and we have encountered teacher's manuals that
are remarkably thorough and extraordinarily useful, at least in terms of thinking about how to
teach a particular case in a fairly conventional way. Still, the standard teacher's manual would be
of little benefit for a situationist torts caseboook.
153. Instead of a stream of bite-sized snacks, the situationist materials would be more like the
proverbial pig through the python-swallowed whole, and then digested over time.
154. For instance, it may be important to ensure that students do not review certain readings
before certain topics are covered in class. We commonly ask our students to describe a "mind's
eye" version of what the parties looked like and what happened in a particular case. Those
descriptions have been surprisingly consistent across most students over the years. To read a
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puzzles raised by the materials and furnish at least one box-top
view of how the jigsaw pieces might be arranged to create a coherent
picture. The manual would also describe some of the most
memorable experiences from, and tougher challenges of, teaching
situationist torts, revealing various connections from within, and
5
15
between, each section.
Just as important, the manual could offer suggestions for how to
teach certain sections and provide sample questions for students with
suggested answers as well as a list of questions often raised by
students and possible responses."6
4. What About Basic Black-Letter Tort Law?
One obvious concern is whether students would adequately
learn basic tort doctrine. That concern flows from the commonly
held presumption that "training lawyers" requires "teaching
doctrine" and lots of it. Not surprisingly, conventional methods,
which usually contain substantial amounts of doctrine, are routinely
hailed as the best methods.'57
Assuming that a major goal of torts instruction is to teach
students doctrine or prepare them for the bar,'58 we doubt that
history of the case (usually implicitly debunking the mind's eye version) prior to that exercise is
to miss the opportunity to demonstrate just how automatic, powerful, and contingent our schemas
can be.
155. Seemingly less important materials at one point in the semester sometimes become quite
important later; a first-time user of the book would need guideposts to help navigate materials
that do not have the tractable rhythm of a case-by-case approach.
156. There are numerous other potential aids to teaching situationist torts that might be
considered, such as annotated powerpoint slides, a case-study wiki on which different professors
or students could contribute additional context, an Internet discussion board for professors
teaching the course, and so on.
157. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
158. We recognize that many, perhaps most, law students matriculate to law school with the
expectation of learning the basics of the law, in hopes of passing the bar and practicing law.
Particularly given those expectations and the high costs of attending law school, there is some
obligation, in our view, to help prepare students for that common path. Law students often spend
in excess of $100,000, reconfigure their personal and family lives, and forgo personal and work
opportunities to attend law school. See generally Vijay Sekhon, The Over-Education of
American Lawyers: An Economic and Ethical Analysis of the Requirementsfor PracticingLaw in
the United States, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769 (2007); Leigh Jones, As SalariesRise, So Does
the Debt, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/
careercenter/lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp?id=l 138701909390.
Law school thus requires a
considerable investment of one's life, and many of those who are willing to invest tend to do so
with professional rewards in mind. We appreciate this investment and what motivates it.
Accepting that as one of the goals, however, is not a good argument for sticking with the
dispositionist status quo or rejecting the situationist approach. We have already summarized
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studying lots of cases furnishes the optimal game plan. In fact, our
own experience from both sides of the podium is that the case
method by itself does little to teach doctrine. Students must attempt
to translate cases into some sort of manageable form by relying on
doctrinal outlines that come, typically, from outside the coursehornbooks, commercial outlines, fellow students' outlines, and the
like. Those doctrinal overviews then act like trees on which the
cases that a professor happened to assign are hung like ornaments.
An equally effective way of teaching doctrine and preparing
students for the bar, in our view, is to incorporate the doctrinal
outline into the materials and require that students learn it. That has
been our approach. In the first packet of materials, students are
given a sizeable, but not overwhelming, doctrinal overview of tort
law-the sort of outline commonly reviewed for bar exams-and are
asked to study it over the following several weeks. One month into
the course, we give students a short, graded, bar-exam-like, multiplechoice quiz to ensure that they have basic familiarity with doctrine.
This practice has worked well with our students, who, ex post, seem
to appreciate having been required to learn a large chunk of
doctrine.'5 9 A situationist torts casebook could similarly contain such
an outline supplemented, perhaps, with overviews of doctrine
relevant to a particular case or section.
5. What About the Goal of Training Good Lawyers?
For reasons that we have already touched on and that we will
expand on below,') a situationist torts casebook would also further
the end of training good lawyers. On the purely practical side, it
would expose students to the work product of real lawyers. To
illuminate both the lawyering experience and the adversarial nature
of the litigation process, a situationist torts casebook would include,
where possible, portions of judges' bench memos, attorneys' briefs,
amicus briefs, and pertinent transcripts from oral testimony,
depositions, and interrogatories.
Those materials should help
some of the common criticisms of conventional practices. See supra Part II. Here we will
describe how we think that students should learn the basic doctrines. Below we will explain
some reasons why we think that learning doctrine does little to assist students to become better
lawyers. See infra Part IV.B.vi.
159. We will have more to say below about why spending significant time on doctrine is
pedagogically unwise. See infra Part III.C.vi.
160. See infra Part V.C.
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students understand how lawyers frame arguments. In addition,
including samples of relatively pedestrian briefs as well as more
exemplary work product can serve as valuable teaching devices.
Much can be learned from such a contrast. Litigation-related
materials will also permit students to witness how judges handle
allegations, factual information, and doctrinal reasoning routinely
furnished by attorneys, but invisible in conventional casebooks. The
materials might, for instance, reveal facts, context, and arguments
later ignored or misconstrued by appellate judges and provide
students with an opportunity to reverse engineer how judges decide
cases. Lessons might also be gleaned about the judicial decisionmaking process from examining the comparative influence of briefs
of disparate quality and from different sources. Moreover, those
materials can shed light on the situational forces moving the parties
and the implications of a case that extend well beyond the litigating
parties. In short, a situationist torts casebook would arguably come
much closer to replicating and illustrating the lawyering experience
than does the now-standard first-year casebook.
Advocacy and evidentiary documents also supply opportunities
for innovative teaching strategies. For instance, assigning the
plaintiffs materials to one portion of the class and the defendant's
materials to a second portion, followed by a class discussion or
debate-perhaps in mock-trial fashion in which a third portion of the
class serves as the judge or jury-offers an ideal way for students not
just to begin thinking like lawyers, but also to begin acting like them.
Participating in such an exercise before reading the actual opinion
can be particularly informative; students debate the underlying issues
prior to learning how a court actually adjudicated those same issues.
The process could yield insights about, not just judicial decisionmaking, but human decision-making. Among other lessons, students
might observe how people can be biased by merely identifying with
a "side."' 61
A situationist torts casebook would also include interviews of
lawyers, litigants, judges, community members, and other parties
who might have affected, or been affected by, a case. Many of those
161. Cf Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 75, at 526-27, 529 n.126; Kent
Greenfield, There's a Forestin Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of Corporationsin Society,
34 GA. L. REv. 1011, 1020-24 (2002) (illustrating how providing perspectives from the plaintiff
and defendant can illuminate class discussion and better inform students of litigation realities).
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materials already exist in newspaper accounts of the underlying
incident, trial, verdict, or aftermath of the case or in law review
articles detailing the case. A situationist torts casebook could also
include web-link boxes containing URLs to, and brief descriptions
of, useful websites, wikis, stories, programs, audio files, videos, and
maps relevant to a given case. Such materials would vivify cases
that are often experienced otherwise as lifeless abstractions.
6. Doesn't Training Good Lawyers Require
Focusing Primarily on Doctrine?
We reject the conventional view that teaching large amounts of
tort doctrine is beneficial, much less necessary, for training good
lawyers.
To begin with, tort law is famously easy. Particularly when
compared to property, contracts, and civil procedure, tort law
doctrine may be, among first-year courses, the least confusing.
There are no major counterintuitive, tricky rules to master-no code
and no rule against perpetuities. It is a natural place to focus on nondoctrinal features; indeed, we suspect that the doctrinal intuitiveness
and simplicity of tort doctrine is, in part, why tort law has been the
wellspring of important legal theories. In short, students can learn
the doctrine fairly easily on their own, without much expert
instruction.
But even if tort doctrine were complicated, no amount of
detailed review is going to be of much help to the students. After all,
most students will not be practicing tort law, and none, in any event,
will be practicing law for at least another couple of years-by which
point they will absolutely have to "learn the law" as if for the first
time anyway. That is true, in part, because two to three years is long
enough for most students to forget the specifics. It is true also
because there are at least fifty versions of tort law, and the variations
across states are not necessarily trivial.162 States routinely feature
different rules, for example, on the elements of negligence claims'63

162. Cf Shawn C. Helms, TranslatingPrivacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. So. &
TECH. L. 288, 310 (2001) (noting the impact of tort law variations by state on Internet privacy).
163. See Howard 0. Hunter & Polly J. Price, Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the
United States, 2001 BYU L. REV. 537, 556 (2001) ("Common law tort doctrines vary from state
to state .. ").
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and damages."64 We know of no casebook-nor would we want to
see one-that attempts to teach the significant doctrinal distinctions
across jurisdictions. One way or another, young lawyers will later
have to learn the specifics of the relevant jurisdiction in which they
practice.
Relatedly, tort law has been one of the most fluid areas of law
over the last fifty years.165 Just consider, for instance, the so-called
"Tort Law Revolution" and its counterrevolution.166 Focusing just on
damages, consider how frequently punitive damages change through
statutory modification,'67 or how such changes routinely intersect
with a complex dynamic of forces found in the U.S. Supreme Court,
state supreme courts, Congress, and state governments.168 And, as
evidenced in recent presidential debates and myriad sources of
political commentary (not to mention this Symposium), our nation
clearly remains in the midst of a deep, philosophical debate about the
proper role of tort law.169 As a result, studying damages at one
moment may not prove as beneficial as first-year students are led to
believe.
For all those reasons, we believe, the best-trained lawyer is not
the one who mastered the minutiae of one version of tort law during
her first year of law school, but the one who best fathoms the forces
shaping tort law and, given that, can find the details on a need-toknow basis. A situationist understanding of tort law is something
that cannot be learned on the spur of the moment. Doctrine can be.

164. See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 421 (2004) ("Punitive damages are allowed in a great majority of states,
although the circumstances permitting such relief vary greatly.").
165. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 145 (1994) (describing the relation of changes in tort law to gender).
166. See PROSSER supra note 5.
167. See, e.g., David M. Gold, Trial by Jury and Statutory Caps on Punitive Damages:
Lessons for Alabamafrom Ohio's ConstitutionalHistory, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (2000); Janet V.
Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs' Rights: The Constitutional Battle over Statutory
Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (1995).
168. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the
Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247 (1997).
169. Transcriptfrom Republican Presidential Candidates Debate, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan.
5, 2008, available at Lexis/Nexis News Wire (comments by Governor Mitt Romney: "And
American corporations-last year they spent more money defending tort lawsuits than they spent
on research and development").
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For all those reasons, we believe tort law is an exceptionally
good place to start with situationism.17 ° But there is more. Training
students to "think like a lawyer" means teaching them not to perfect
doctrinal distinctions, but to understand how a complex problemsuch as a toxic spill or poverty-implicates many areas of law,
including tort law. Given that very few students will become "tort
lawyers" but that many will face problems that entail a tort
component, the situationist approach may again be an improvement
over common practices.17 ' As Professors Minow and Rakoff explain:
What we are saying

. . .

is that students need more [than

they are now getting with the conventional case method],
and they need more not for arcane or unusual careers, but
simply to be good lawyers ....

[W]hen we think of what

students most need that they do not now get, we think:
"legal imagination." What they most crucially lack, in
other words, is the ability to generate the multiple
characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, and
multiple solutions, to which they could apply their very
well honed analytic skills. And unless they acquire legal
imagination somewhere other than in our appellate-casemethod classrooms, they will be poorer lawyers than they
should be."'2
It is not just that the doctrine-heavy case method fails to
encourage imagination; it impedes it by removing the real-life
complexity from a policy quandary, preempting consideration of
larger situational factors, and truncating any discussion of potential
policy solutions:
Langdell's case method fails in this mission [of teaching
students to "think like a lawyer"]. It fails because lawyers
increasingly need to think in and across more settings, with
170. Cf Quinn Murphy, Policy-Driven Tort Analysis: Peelingthe Onion from the Inside Out!,
45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 913, 913 (2001) ("Torts makes sense on a conceptual level to first-year
students whose moral sense of right and wrong are often consistent with existing tort law....
[Also], tort law is predominantly black letter law, which appeals to first-year students who have
not yet become comfortable with the endless levels of ambiguity ever present in the American
legal system." (citations omitted)).
171. Cf Susan Gochros, Career Options for Hawaii Attorneys in State and County
Government Offices, 2 HAW. B.J. 6, 38 (Nov. 1998) (describing benefits of becoming familiar
with "many different areas of the law").
172. Rakoff& Minow, supranote 90, at 602.
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more degrees of freedom, than appear in the universe
established by appellate decisions and the traditional
questions arising from them. The Langdellian approach
treats too many dimensions as already fixed. When what is
at issue is whether an appellate bench correctly decided a
case, or how its decision fits into the general fabric of
appellate decisions, self-evidently we have already decided
that the paradigmatic institutional setting for thinking about
a legal problem is the appellate court. Accordingly, we will
restrict our consideration of the proper incidence of legal
force to the modes that courts can use. By focusing on
appellate cases, we also assume that the facts of the
problem are known: if not because they are really known,
then because the rules of procedure will treat them as no
longer contestable. Moreover, most of what we know will
consist of what K.C. Davis denominated "adjudicative
facts" rather than "legislative facts": The who, what, and
when of the named parties, rather than information about
the social situation in general. Typically the procedural
rules (either the rules governing how parties frame an issue
for decision or the rules governing discretionary review)
will also stipulate the issue (or small set of issues) that are
open for discussion." 3
But even for those students who are dead-set on becoming tort
lawyers and accident attorneys who handle only conventional tort
law cases, we do not believe that filling them with doctrine does as
much to help them succeed as does teaching them about the ideas,
arguments, and political and economic forces that mold tort law.
That is true for reasons we have already listed, but it is true for other
reasons as well.
First, there is something to Langdell's claim.
There is
something to be said for possessing such a mastery of an area of law
that one can apply doctrine "with constant facility and certainty to
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs."' 74 But the means to that
end, it seems to us, is not to know an area of doctrine cold. What,

173. Id. at 600.
174. LANGDELL, supra note 77, at vii; see also Rakoff & Minow, supra note 90, at 599; supra
note 96 and accompanying text.
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exactly, are the benefits of supplying doctrinal specificity,
particularly when each case in a traditional torts casebook arose from

a different jurisdiction, at a different time, before a different judge,
confronting different issues, and featuring different levels of
expertise among the litigants, attorneys, and witnesses? What good

is such a snapshot of a moving target? To make useful predictions, it
may be more valuable to know what is moving the target-what is

moving the tort ball.
Second, a tort lawyer will not enjoy great success by handling
the standard slip-and-fall cases-though, no doubt, it's a living.
Success will require knowing how to manage the unusual, difficult
case-in which the law is unclear and in which lawyers find

themselves, to borrow a phrase, on "the frontiers of tort law.

'175

It is

good
within those gray interstices of black-letter doctrine where
76

theory and a deep understanding of the law are most needed.

This discussion has assumed that an important goal of law
school and its courses is to prepare students to pass the bar exam and

to become successful practitioners of law.

For the reasons just

reviewed, a situationist approach would accomplish those ends,
possibly better than any existing approach. We admit, though, that

absent more experience, we have little to go on besides our own
biased, hopeful speculation.
Supposing we are wrong, we might still prefer a situationist
alternative to the current methods of teaching torts. That is true
because, ultimately, we doubt that our primary obligation is to the
financial success or even to the professional skills of our students.

By the way we teach (or the ways we do not teach), we are shaping,
175. Indeed, to be a good tort law lawyer means knowing how tort law will react in different
situations, for such knowledge can help an attorney assess the prospects of a potential case and, if
one takes a case, more effectively advocate before a court. Put another way, a good tort lawyer is
not one who can only regurgitate tort flash cards. We concede, however, that flash cards may be
helpful for studying for the bar. See Denise Reibe, A Bar Review for Law Schools: Getting
Students on Board to Pass Their Exams, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 269, 307 (2007).
176. Cf Stanchi, supra note 129, at 611-12 ("[T]he focus on teaching doctrine via the case
method defines 'thinking like a lawyer' in a cramped and one-dimensional way. It is not even
clear whether analyzing common law cases was wholly reflective of what 'thinking like a lawyer'
meant 100 years ago (Langdell had his critics even then), and it is certainly not an accurate
reflection of what lawyering is, and should be, today. In my view, 'thinking like a lawyer' means
mastering doctrine and being skilled, but it also should mean having a strong sense of the theories
related to the doctrine, as well as the criticisms of the doctrine. And, most importantly, 'thinking
like a lawyer' means knowing how to use not only doctrine, but legal theory and legal criticisms
in a practical context.").
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Our system of justice is in the

balance, a system that poses undeniably immense implications for
people around the globe who are directly or indirectly subject to it.
The problem is not simply that bad laws pose a threat, but also that
the conventional approach stands in the way of the law's promise.
As Professors Minow and Rakoff put it: "[O]ur society is full of new
problems demanding new solutions. Less so than in the past ...are
lawyers inventing those solutions .... In our view, the stodginess of
American legal education is partly to blame." '77 Arguably, our

primary responsibility, therefore, should not rest on preparing
students to appeal to the gatekeepers of the state bars but rather to
study and teach about the implications of our system and to help
better ensure that the values espoused by those who defend our legal
system are realized.'
V. WHY SITUATIONIsM Now?

If we are right that our proposed approach is significantly

different from existing approaches, then skepticism from our readers
would be both predictable and understandable.

We ourselves, in

fact, have significant doubts about whether many other professors
would opt to take the sort of approach we propose-particularly in
light of the history of resistance to such reforms and the situational

advantages of the conventional dispositionist approach.'79
As we have already hinted, the history of American legal
education is strewn with the asterisks of failed curricular challenges

and alternative casebooks, and the Langdellian dynasty remains
firmly entrenched.'

Even the relatively recent efforts at change

177. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 90, at 597.
178. We hasten to add that law schools hold themselves out as doing more than simply
training students to be technicians. Law schools are training leaders and shapers of society. See
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of

Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REv. 515, 537 (2007) (noting that endorsing goals of
detached mastery and excellence for its own sake is "inconsistent with law schools' stated
mission of developing leaders and advancing social justice and acts as a barrier to meaningful
change") [hereinafter Sturm & Guinier, The Law School Matrix]; Toby Stock, Harvard Law
School, A Message from the Dean of Admissions, http://www.law.harvard.edu/admissions/jd/
(May 2007) (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (informing potential applicants that Harvard Law School
students are here to "learn how to be great lawyers and leaders") (emphasis added).
179. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 112-116.
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have been met with overwhelming opposition. 8 ' The one partial
exception may be the incorporation of economics, 1 2 but even that

success has been mixed and modest in the classroom.'83
For seven core reasons, however, we are hopeful that the
situation might be right for a turn toward the situationist.
A. Bridging the Gap Between Social Science and Law
As already noted, the most dramatic curricular jolt experienced
in law schools has been the introduction and proliferation of law and

economics. Professor Thomas Ulen calls law and economics "one of
the most successful innovations in the legal academy in the last

century.""'

But one need not be an expert to recognize the

181. See Orin Kerr, Richard Pierce on Law School Curricular Reform, to Volokh Conspiracy
(Oct. 31, 2007, 3:15pm) http://volokh.com/posts/l 193858120.shtml (noting resistance to
curricular reform attempts at the University of Virginia School of Law and Columbia Law
School). Some commentators have blamed such resistance on the skepticism of law school
administrations and faculty regarding the need for change. See, e.g., Amy M. Colton, Eyes to the
Future, Yet Remembering, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 963, 981 (2004). Others point to a failure of
law school administrators to reward reform that has been initiated by faculty. See, e.g., Maureen
F. Fitzgerald, What's Wrong with Legal Research and Writing? Problems and Solutions, 88 LAW
LIBR.J. 247, 260-61 n.49 (1996) (citing comments by Victor Rosenbloom).
182. George Mason University Law School is the leading example of a law school
incorporating economics into its curriculum. See Alfred L. Brophy, Law School: The Emerging
Importance of Law Review Rankings for Law School Rankings, 2003-2007, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
35, 42 n.21 (2007) (noting the rise of the school in conjunction with George Mason Law Review);
Mark F. Grady, Two Visionary Deans of George Mason Law School, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 59, 6263 (2001) (discussing the significance of legal economist Henry G. Manne becoming dean of
George Mason Law School in 1986).
183. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 579-80 ("To the extent that change has been
desired by some in legal education, it has succeeded only with heavily funded initiatives from
outside of the legal academy."). The most successful effort to influence legal theory has been
through the Olin Foundation's support of Law and Economics scholarship and other initiatives.
"Efforts by the Russell Sage Foundation to seed law and social science approaches to legal study
were more modest (and took root in only a few schools-Wisconsin, Denver, Buffalo, and, for
some time, Yale and Chicago)." Id. at 579; see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 20,
at 272-84 (describing the influence of the Olin Foundation in promoting law and economics in
legal academia). Consider also curricular reform at Columbia Law School, referenced in supra
note 181. In 1989, the school added a mandatory fall-semester course for 1Ls called Introduction
to Law & Economics. See Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law
Schools: A Critical Assessment, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1992). The course is no longer
required, and the law school now features a relatively traditional first-year curriculum. See
Columbia Curriculum Guide, http://www.law.columbia.edu/academics/curriculum (click "Open
the Curriculum Guide," click radio button for "Foundation Curriculum," and check "Fall" and
"Spring" boxes, and click the "Search" button) (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
184. Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 433, 434 (1997). Other distinguished scholars have similarly praised the influence of the
law and economics movement. See Douglas G. Baird, The Future of Law and Economics:
Looking Forward,64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1997); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 568.
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prominence of economic theory on law's landscape. Even a cursory
scan of course offerings and casebooks reveals that almost every law
school offers at least a basic course in law and economics, and most
casebooks include substantive analyses of the intersection between

that theory and a given area of law.'85
The success of law and economics is a manifestation of
situational influences; indeed, its appeal turns in part on the fact that
it is highly dispositionist and thus affirming of the Langdellian
starting point.'86 In a way, though, law and economics has also
changed the situation, which is why we mention it. Through its
success and influence, law and economics has changed the norms of
what is acceptable in legal theory and law teaching. Both have
become more interdisciplinary in recent years (the former more than
the latter), and social scientific methods have gained in
prominence.'87 Consequently, the path is more open now for other
social scientific and interdisciplinary approaches than it was thirty
years ago and certainly than it was when Langdell was holding
seating charts.' 88
At the same time that interdisciplinary approaches and, in
particular, social scientific methods have come into vogue among
legal academics, the social scientific evidence of our attributional
185. See Robin Paul Malloy, Reviewing Dau-Schmidt & Ulen, Law and Economics
Anthology, and Mercuro & Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism,
8 DIGEST 37, 37 (2000) (book review).
186. Those themes are developed at length elsewhere. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation,
supra note 20; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,supra note 20; see also supra note
183 (mentioning the role of the Olin Foundation and promoting law and economics); cf Gordon,
Geological Strata, supra note 97, at 367 ("Of the modem interdisciplinary movements, Law and
Economics has made the most impact, partly I think because much of its style of thinking was
already latent, albeit in much less rigorous form, in the types of policy analysis bequeathed by
social law and legal realism; it gave lawyers a more rigorous method of doing what they did
already.").
187. See, e.g., Thomas S.Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law and Other
Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 403, 404-05
(2004).
188. Arguably, law and economics has helped lay a groundwork on which even very critical
theorists might gain some additional traction in the classroom. Cf Penelope Pether, Measured
Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility of Equity, 14 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT.
489, 537-38 (2002) (arguing that law schools should strive for an interdisciplinary approach to
law teaching); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice
Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 75 (2003)
(discussing syllabi of courses on Asian Americans and the Law and noting that "[t]hey each
marshal interdisciplinary materials to bring into sharp relief the uses of Law in the origin and
construction of everyday realities shaping Asian American lives").
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errors has been piling up. As legal academics begin to explore new
fields, they are encountering discoveries that have far reaching
implications for law and legal theory. Indeed, in recent years, social
psychology, social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and other mind
sciences have problematized the long-dominant conception of the
person. 189 It is as if the legal world had been operating on geocentric
assumptions and was only now beginning to confront the heliocentric
discoveries of modem astronomy.19
The implications are too
profound to assimilate. Nonetheless, some legal theorists are now
beginning to grapple with that evidence, and we suspect that their
project will be long-lived.
It has already been shown that insights from the mind sciences
can help us better understand law and legal theory. Consider the
research of Professors Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan T. Fiske,' 9 '
who illustrated that judges are appreciably affected by cognitive
biases and situational influences when interpreting the meaning of
ambiguous statutory provisions, examining essential elements of
proof and defense, justifying established or novel constitutional
doctrines, assessing whether and how much to punish criminal
defendants, and formulating legal rules.192
Furthermore, it is not difficult to find examples of the mind
sciences informing judicial reasoning. Indeed, more than a decade
ago, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that "[b]ias
189. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
190. This transition toward situationism has been occurring in other disciplines, often well
ahead of the transition in legal theory. It is also a transition that many students are amenable to
(even if judges continue to write their opinions as if they are Langdellian formalists). Cf Rakoff
& Minow, supra note 90, at 601 ("The students we now teach are all raised with media renditions
of multiple perspectives, time shifts, and conflicting realities . . .they live in a world that
presumes the influence of perspective on what is known and what is real. The appellate decision
neither acknowledges this world nor equips the student to unpack how courts stabilize lived
experiences so that the law may be applied.").
191. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and DisparateTreatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1009 (2006).
192. Id.; see also Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: The
PrematureDemise of SituationistLaw and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 24 (2005); Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking
and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 744 (2005) (noting that judges are
subject to cognitive biases); Judith A. McMorrow, The (F) Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney
Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 46-47 (2005) (discussing how both
intuition and empirical data confirm that judges are deeply affected by cognitive errors).

1422

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1345

both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and
unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come
down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely
'
That was not the first
to become this country's law and practice."193
in the Court's jurisprudence, and
explicit mention of implicit9 biases
4
last.1
the
not
certainly
it was
Much has also been written about the social psychology of jury
deliberations,195 the burgeoning use of expert psychological evidence
in trials, 96 and, more generally, the power of emotions and other
internal situational influences in how we formulate, interpret, and
respond to laws,'97 including tort law.198 The basic lesson of much of
193. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
This comment by Justice Ginsburg has attracted much attention in the legal academy. Indeed,
some believe it will prove to be one of the defining comments of her tenure on the Court. See
Deborah Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Jurisprudence of
Opportunityand Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 45-46 (2004).
194. For a more recent example, see Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S.Ct. 2218 (2007) (discussing
whether the granting of a motion to excuse for cause constitutes an implicit bias in the procedure
of a case).
195. See, e.g., Joan B. Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations, in THE JURY
SYSTEM INAMERICA 69 (Rita James Simon ed., 1975); Garold Stasser, Norbert L. Kerr & Robert
M. Bray, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations:Structure, Process, and Product, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 221 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, eds., 1982); cf
Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley, & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish?:Deterrence and
Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002)
(examining the psychology of punishment and some of its implications for the legal system);
Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006) (examining how the likelihood of being sentenced to
death is influenced by the degree to which a black defendant is perceived to have a stereotypically
black appearance).
196. See, e.g., CHARLES PATRICK EWING & JOSEPH T. MCCANN, MINDS ON TRIAL: GREAT
CASES INLAW AND PSYCHOLOGY (2006); Megan J. Erickson, Note, Daubert's Bipolar Treatment
of Scientific Expert Testimony-From Frye's Polygraph to Farewell'sBrain Fingerprinting,55
DRAKE L. REV. 763 (2007) (providing an analysis of the use of scientific evidence in expert
testimony).
197. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously:
An Essayfor Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1569 (2000); Michael A. McCann, It's Not About
the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics Among Professional
Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459 (2006); David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist
View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for the Law (unpublished working
paper), availableat: http://ssm.com/abstract-l003562.
198. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, supra note 68; Geoffrey
Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 111 (2008)
(describing how recent work in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics indicates that
individuals fail to process risk in the way the black-letter-law definition of recklessness presumes,
which calls into question the degree to which decisions can easily be classified as "conscious" or
"unconscious").
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that research is that the model (dispositional) chooser, voter,
consumer, or actor imagined in law and legal theory is generally far
different from the actual humans (situational characters) who are
subject to, and responsible for, those laws and legal theories.199
There is other evidence that law schools, among other university
departments, 20 have been taking the mind sciences increasingly
seriously in recent years. The chart below 21 signifies the number of
law review articles that cite to three prominent social
psychologists-Mahzarin Banaji, Stanley Milgram, and Tom
Tyler-in the last four sets of five-year increments:

199. See Hanson & Yosifon, The SituationalCharacter,supra note 20, at 24-32; supra Part
II.
200. See, e.g., Kwame Anthony Appiah, The New New Philosophy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec.
9, 2007, at 34 (describing "recent movement known as 'experimental philosophy,' which has
rudely challenged the way professional philosophers like to think of themselves").
201. We conducted the relevant search on June 20, 2008. We used the "US Law Reviews and
Journals, Combined" database on Lexis/Nexis. For more precise data, including indication of
citation to other social psychologists, see the chart below. The extrapolation factor of 1.439 is
based on a projection of current citations in this five-year period. It assumes that the citation rate
will continue at the same rate for the balance of that period.
Time Period

Pre
1990

1990-1994

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005present

Search Used
in
WESTLAW

Before
1990

1/1/199012/31/1994

1/1/199512/31/1999

1/1/200012/31/2004

2005 and
after

12

29

67

96

92

2

10

28

36

36

7
0
0
0

129
17
0
0

310
100
11
7

491
266
25
35

388
221
144
81

0
23

0
206

0
555

14
986

49
1,011

Social
Scientists
Stanley
Milgram
Philip
Zimbardo
Tom Tyler*
John Darley
Susan Fiske
Mahzarin
Banaji
John Jost
TOTAL

projection
20052009
calc based
on current
to date
*1.439

133
52
558
318
207
116
71
1,455
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Though the chart is hardly irrefutable proof of the mind
sciences' ascendancy in the legal academy, it suggests increased
awareness by legal academics of some of the more prominent social
psychologists.
Recent titles of books and law review articles also suggest a
growing acceptance of situationist insights. The emergence of
behavioral economics is one indicator of that trend. 2 From 1980 to
2003, 449 articles included the phrase "cognitive biases.""2 ' In the
last four and a half years alone, 712 articles have included that
phrase.204
But deeper dips into the mind sciences have also been occurring
at increasing rates. There have, for instance, been numerous
interdisciplinary conferences over the last several years, including
the annual American Psychology-Law Society Conference,0 5 the
Law and the Emotions Conference, 2 " and the First 2 and Second"'
202. See, eg., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 22-25 (2000) (discussing rise of
behavioral law and economics); William K. Black, The Inperium Strikes Back: The Need to
Teach Socioeconornics to Law Students, 41 SAN DIEGO L. R.Ev. 231, 239-41 (2004) (providing
account of the rise of the behavioral law and economics).
203. We conducted this search on June 20, 2008. We used the "US Law Reviews and
Journals, Combined" database on Lexis/Nexis, and searched between January 1, 1980 and
December 31, 2002.
204. Id. (searching between January 1, 2003 and June 20, 2008).
205. 2008 AP-LS Conference. http://www.ap-ls.org'conferenees/apIs2008/index.htnl (last
visited Nov. 15, 2008).
206. Law and the Emotions: New Directions in Scholarship, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
histitutes/csls/lawemotion conference/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2008).
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Conferences on Law and Mind Sciences.
There are now
innumerable law review articles drawing from the mind sciences and
some promoting new theoretical approaches based on the mind
sciences. Situationism, Behavioral Realism 2 9 and Empirical Legal
Realism 2" are three closely related examples of that trend. Recent

212
1
book publications by law faculty ' and by social psychologists
further illustrate that movement.
So too does contemporary media coverage of the law. Jeffrey
Rosen's The Brain on the Stand in the New York Times and Steven
Keeva's A Failure of Imagination in the American Bar Association
Journal are two prominent examples. 213 Law-related blogs have
likewise evinced this trend, with Adam Kolber's Neuroethics & Law
Blog, not to mention The Situationist, frequently featuring posts
related to mind sciences and law.21 4

207. The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School, March 2007 Conference
Links, http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=kl3943&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup16103 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2008).
208. The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School, March 2008 Conference
Links http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=kl3943&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup31321
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2008).
209. See, e.g., Symposium, BehavioralRealism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
210. See, e.g., Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of
Law andHuman Behavior, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003).
211. See, e.g., NORMAN J. FINKEL & W. GERROD PARROTT, EMOTIONS AND CULPABILITY:
HOW THE LAW IS AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF (2006); SEMIR ZEKI &
OLIVER GOODENOUGH, LAW AND THE BRAIN (2006). For a less recent, though still relevant
example, see THE NEUROTRANSMITTER REVOLUTION: SEROTONIN, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, AND THE
LAW (Roger D. Masters & Michael T. McGuire eds., 1994).
212. See, e.g., BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2007); TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (James R. P. Ogloff ed., 2002).
213. Steven Keeva, A Failure of Imagination, 90 A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 74; Jeffrey Rosen,
The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 49; see also Daniel Weiss, What
Would You Do?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 41.
Over the last decade, as best-sellers such as The Tipping Point and Freakonomicshave
lent social science a sheen of counterintuitive hipness and reality television has tapped
into a cultural fascination with how people behave in contrived situations, journalistic
experimentation has become increasingly common. In addition to The Washington
Post Magazine, it has been featured in The New York Times, Harper's,and Reader's
Digest.
Its most regular home, however, has been on network-television
newsmagazines.
Id.
214. According to Blogflux.com, there are 854 English and non-English blogs related
psychology. Blogflux.com, Blog Directory, http://dir.blogflux.com/cat/psychology-18.html (last
visited on Nov. 15, 2008). Of course, many of the 854 psychology blogs also periodically feature
entries related to the law.
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The emergent incorporation of mind sciences in the legal
academy may in part reflect a recent organizational shift in social
psychology and social cognition. For most of the twentieth century,
admits John Cacioppo, President of the Association for
Psychological Science, "psychological science could be described as
a set of balkanized fields with specialized journals regarded as the
place to publish by those within a field and read by few outside that
field."2 '5 Even as recently as 1991, social psychologist Thomas Scott
complained that psychology "is a federation of often-unrelated
disciplines," lacking "a clear identity." '16 Perhaps for the same
reason many academics in other disciplines found the mind sciences
to be unduly cumbersome to draw upon.
Times have changed, however, as Cacioppo now calls
psychology a "hub scientific discipline" and "an integrative,
'
multilevel science." 217
The reorganization has made the mind
sciences better equipped to aid academics in other fields, a
phenomenon that advances the arguments of those academics calling
for the incorporation of psychology in their respective disciplines. 8
As explained by Tom Tyler, it has also enabled psychology to better
inform and refine interdisciplinary approaches to theoretical and
practical questions of law." 9 That reorganization may help explain
the recent shift within law and economics toward a "behavioral law
and economic" model, which accepts some of the insights from
psychology and related mind sciences."' Indeed, frustration with law
and economics provided an independent motive for seeking other
explanations for human behavior as seen through the law.221 In any
215. John T. Cacioppo, The Structure of Psychology,OBSERVER Dec. 2007, at 3, availableat
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/getArticle.cfm?id=2259.
216. Id. (italics omitted).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman & Deepak K. Malhotra, Economics Wins, Psychology Loses,
and Society Pays, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 263 (David De Cremer, Marcel
Zeelenberg & J. Keith Murnighan eds., 2006) (two Harvard Business School professors
advocating on behalf of the integration of psychology in business school scholarship).
219. See Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283, 340-41 (2003) (explaining the value of psychology in exploring legal issues
related to minority profiling by police).
220. See Michel J.J. Handgraaf & W. Fred van Raaij, Fear and Loathing No More: The
Emergence of CollaborationBetween Economists and Psychologists, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 387
(2005); Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After BehavioralEconomics,
55 KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007).
221. See supra note 220.
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event, at the very moment that legal scholars were inclined to look
for interdisciplinary bridges to build toward social sciences,
psychology was well placed to begin building toward law.
Other relatively situationist schools or fields within law may
also be showing a renewed momentum over the last few years. The
recent set of histories in tort law suggests an opening, perhaps a call,
for a situationist approach to torts. One leading example of such
histories is Robert Rabin and Stephen Sugarman's Tort Stories, a
supplemental text that provides students with a contextual--or what
we might call situational-understanding of ten leading tort cases,
focusing on how the litigation was shaped by lawyers, judges, and
socioeconomic factors, and why the cases have attained landmark
status.222 Tort Stories, like other books in the Stories series, is
intended, not just for legal scholars, but also for law students to
provide some depth and context to the one-dimensional casebook
renditions.
The books have received praise from both legal
academics and law students alike-praise that we suspect may reveal
a growing appetite for more situationist approaches.223
B. Bridging the Gap Between Scholarshipand Teaching
A second reason that a situationist casebook might be more
successful now than in the past is that law school faculty members
(particularly junior, tenure-track professors) are under increasing
'
pressure to "publish or perish,"224
where tenure and promotion
decisions are primarily measured by scholarly production and
placement. Moreover, to obtain placement in top law reviews,
scholarship is expected to be interdisciplinary and broad in focus,
222. TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
223. See, e.g., Erin Jones, Book Note, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 246, 246-47 (2007)
(praising Tort Stories for evaluating the relative importance of factual, legal, and policy
arguments presented in a given case); Erin Elizabeth McMurray, Note, "I Expected Common
Sense to Prevail": Vowles v. Evans, Amateur Rugby, and Referee Negligence in the U.K., 29
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1307, 1309-10 & n.14 (2004) (written by a law student who found Rabin's
background of Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) very useful).
224. See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of "Law & Economics ", 35 CAP. U. L. REV.
787, 788-89 (2007) ("The publish-or-perish mantra has become a household motto for faculty
members, at least at the early stages of their careers."); Trotter Hardy, Review of Hibbitts's Last
Writes?, 30 AKRON L. REv. 249, 252 (1996) (discussing Professor Bernard Hibbitts's argument
that "there has been an increasing pressure for law faculty to publish or perish"); Mitchell
Nathanson, Taking the Road Less Traveled: Why Practical Scholarship Makes Sense for the
Legal Writing Professor, 11 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 329, 345 (2005) ("In order to reach the goal
[of tenure], there is great pressure on tenure-track professors to publish in elite law reviews.").
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and, increasingly, to contain many of the elements that are
traditionally not included in the first-year pedagogy.
In light of those expectations, one of the main, traditional
advantages of the Langdellian dispositionist case method-a lowcost way to begin teaching a subject 225-begins to have drawbacks.
The simplicity of the case method for teaching has to be balanced
against the irrelevance of the case method for research. The gap that
currently exists between writing and teaching 26 can be more easily
narrowed by adopting a relatively situationist pedagogy. Such a
teaching approach may require a more significant investment in
preparation, but that investment would generate scholarly returns.
Given the situation of many tenure-track law professors, therefore, a
turn towards situationism in the classroom may now be welcomed.
C. Bridging the Gap Between the "Real World"
and the Classroom
The chasm between what legal scholars generally know about
the law and the way they teach it, has contributed to the growing
But a related
dissatisfaction with law school pedagogy. 227
dissatisfaction is now being expressed from other quarters.
From outside the Ivory Towers, for example, there has been a
common complaint about the artificial constructs endemic to most
One practicing
exchanges between law faculty and students.
attorney recently put it this way:
In today's world, most legal transactions-certainly
those faced by the vast majority of lawyers-are no longer
single-shot transactions reflecting one area of the law. The
complexity of today's world and every transaction, whether
personal, governmental, business, or otherwise, is too
multifaceted to approach issues as if they were susceptible
to legal analysis based upon a single area of the law....
Perhaps I am merely asking for the application of "Law and
Reality," since in reality, few questions facing today's
225. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103.
226. See supra text accompanying note 224.
227. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text; see also Adam Neufeld, Costs of an
Outdated Pedagogy? Study on Gender at HarvardLaw School, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& L. 511, 519-20 (2005) (discussing criticisms of the Langellian method in the context of gender
study).
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lawyer are unidimensional and clearly cut from a single
strand of legal reasoning. When problems are approached
in the classroom as if they stood all alone, we are
shortchanging both our students and the profession.228
The disconnected sterility of the case method elicits a similar
dissatisfaction. In a recent study of law school pedagogy, the
Carnegie Foundation identified a number of related concerns:
By questioning and argumentative exchange with faculty,
students are led to analyze situations by looking for points
of dispute or conflict and considering as "facts" only those
details that contribute to someone's staking a legal claim on
the basis of precedent. .

.

. [T]he case-dialogue method

drills students, over and over, in first abstracting from
natural contexts, then operating on the facts so abstracted
according to specified rules and procedures; they then draw
conclusions based upon that reasoning. Students discover
that to thinking like a lawyer means redefining messy
situations of actual or potential conflict as opportunities for
advancing a client's cause through legal argument before a
judge or through negotiation.229
Expressed in our terms, the Carnegie study reveals that teachers are
teaching and students are learning law as a subject matter
significantly divorced from reality-with the goal to simplify,
abstract, dispositionalize, and distance oneself from the complex,
untidy, contingent situations of what actually took place. 3
Such findings have been confirmed in studies of law students
themselves. In a 1994 Robert Granfield found that the process of
learning to "think like a lawyer" left many students unable to take

228. Wayne S. Hyatt, A Lawyer's Lament: Law Schools and the Profession of Law, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 385, 398 (2007).
229. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND & LEE
S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 187 (2007).
230. Cf Eleanor M. Fox, The Good Law School, the Good Curriculum, and the Mind and the
Heart, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473, 477 (1989) (describing traditional legal education as presenting
law as a "cold ... intellectual puzzle" in which the "mind was split from the heart" (internal
quotations omitted)) [hereinafter Fox, The Good Law School]; Robert Granfield, Constructing
ProfessionalBoundaries in Law School: Reflections of Students and Implicationsfor Teachers, 4
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 53, 63 (1994) (reporting Harvard law students'
disappointment that most of their classes made them feel that "[t]he real life drama of human
events as well as social context is considered superfluous to the legal issues").
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sides on policy questions. The following quote from a second-year
Harvard Law student is representative:
What happened to me my first year was that I
began to realize that in law there are no principles,
you can always construct an argument for anything.
As I began to realize this, I became less invested in
the ideas and beliefs I once had. I often wonder what
I believe now. I could represent anyone you asked me
to, but ask what I believe, I don't think I could really
say.

23 1

In a 2005 introduction to a new law journal, two Harvard Law
School students summarized the problem of their contemporaries this
way:
Once we've learned how to argue any point to anyone in
any way, it's remarkably easy to convince ourselves that
defending toxic tort suits is somehow morally equivalent to
prosecuting them. While this may seem in some ways
liberating[,] . . . it is in fact also limiting in a deeply
frightening way. Trapped in this self-imposed straitjacket,
we deny responsibility for making the choice and refuse to
see the consequences thereafter. Therefore we no longer
act as agents, in the sense that we no longer see ourselves
as affecting the world with each decision.232
The 2007 Carnegie Report picks up on many of those same themes:
By contrast, the task of connecting [the abstractionbased] conclusions with the rich complexity of actual
situations that involve full-dimensional people, let alone the
job of thinking through the social consequences or ethical
aspects of the conclusions, remains outside the casedialogue method. Issues such as the social needs or matters
of justice involved in cases do get attention in some casedialogue classrooms, but these issues are almost always
treated as addenda. Being told repeatedly that such matters
fall, as they do, outside the precise and orderly "legal
231. Granfield, supra note 230, at 66; see also Stanchi, supra note 129, at 613 (describing
how even classes taught by more critically inclined professors can have that distancing effect on
students).
232. Zinaida Miller & Brishen Rodgers, Radicalism and Responsibility: An Introduction to
Unbound, I UNBOUND i, iv (2005).
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landscape," students often conclude that they are secondary
to what really counts for success in law school-and in
legal practice. In their all-consuming first year, students are
told to set aside their desire for justice. They are warned
not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the people
in the cases they discuss cloud their legal analyses.
This warning does help students escape the grip of
misconceptions about how the law works in order to hone
their analytical skills. But when the misconceptions are not
addressed directly, students have no way of learning when
and how their moral concerns may be relevant to their work
as lawyers and when these concerns could throw them off
track. Students often find this confusing and disillusioning.
The fact that moral concerns are reintroduced only
haphazardly conveys a cynical impression of the law that is
rarely intended.233
We agree. We would caution, however, that the problem is less the
result of using cases and more the consequence of using large
numbers of cases and little else. Supplemented with the messiness of
situation, a case can teach not only the law, but both the "social
consequences" of the law and the harmfully sanitizing influence of
the lawmaking process. Done properly, as sketched in Part IV
233. See SULLIVAN supra note 229, at 187-88. See also Maria O'Brien Hylton, Creeping
Impoverization: Material Conditions, Income Inequality, and Erisa Pedagogy Early in the 21st
Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1355, 1361-62 (2007) (Symposium on What Is the Place of
Poverty Law in the Law School Curriculum?: Looking Back and Planningfor the Future).
As it stands, however, there is little, if any, room in the present first year curriculum for
candid, value-based discussions. This flaw is inherent in the socialization process that
is the ultimate objective of the first year of law school. Learning to 'think like a
lawyer' through the Case and Socratic Methods almost completely discounts the social,
moral, and ethical dimensions present in the actual practice of law. As a result, most
law students are not fully conscious of the social contexts in which the law exists and
are thus not adequately prepared to address the issues that accompany them in practice.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Zeppos, supra note 91, at 332.
Professor [Elizabeth] Mertz finds that law professors use the Socratic Method to refocus student attention from questions of content to questions of authority. In
discussing cases, professors insist on precise identification authority issues, sometimes
to the point of demanding an exact repetition of the opinion's language, but encourage
a highly speculative reconstruction of the litigants' underlying interaction that converts
it into legal discourse. The result is to create a closed linguistic system which is
capable of in essence gobbling up all manner of social detail without budging its core
assumptions.

Id. (internal citations

omitted).
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above, the case method comprises a useful means of demonstrating
how the law works and of emphasizing "matters of justice." Indeed,
by taking other related areas of law and placing the legal cases within
their historical and social context, and by examining the socialpsychological forces at work, a situationist torts casebook would
enable law professors to employ case law as a device for illuminating
major social issues like poverty, racism, healthcare, the environment,
and so on. At its core, such a casebook could demonstrate how tort
law constitutes one of many strands contained in an interconnected
web of causation and behavior. Consequently, topics generally
omitted in basic first-year courses would become meaningful and, at
times, crucial.234
We concede that evolving from the classic pedagogical model
would undoubtedly prove difficult. Yet as related policy problems
continue to worsen, the pressure for confronting them-and the
frustrations from ignoring them-will only build. A situationist
approach may relieve that pressure and those frustrations. Better yet,
it might help prepare students and professors to better imagine and
design potential solutions.235
D. Bridging the Race and Gender Gaps
One can readily observe how the dispositionist curriculum and
pedagogy unequally affect identity groups. The effects are apparent
in the classroom itself and, not surprisingly, students and professors
alike have joined the call for reform. Kimberl Crenshaw, for
instance, writes:
Minority students across the country have waged a series of
protests to draw attention to problems of diversity in the
nation's law schools. Although the students' bottom line
demand is often for the recruitment of more minority
faculty and students, the anger and frustration apparent in
these protests indicate that the disappointment is not simply
over the lack of "color" in the hallways. The dissatisfaction
goes much deeper-to the substantive dynamics of the

234. See infra text accompanying notes 254-257.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 295-300.
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classroom and their particular impact on minority
students. 36
Why do the substantive dynamics of the law school classroom elicit
this response? In part, because the classroom itself is a situation that
varyingly affects different groups. In her classic study of Harvard
students, Catherine Krupnick found not only that "men and women
behave differently as speakers, or that male and female students do,
but that at Harvard male and female students do. It is sometimes
thought that the admissions process evens out the differences, and, to
be sure, every teacher can cite examples of "extremely articulate
female students,' 237 but the general pattern revealed "that male
students talked much longer in the predominant classroom
circumstance"-a result that itself was somewhat situationally
dependent. 238 Krupnick concluded that "the classroom environment
is a likely factor in women's less than equal experience of
' an issue that "should be monitored carefully by those
coeducation,"239
240
who care about providing equal education.
Some years later, Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, Jane Balin, Ann
Bartow, and Deborah Lee Stachel undertook the challenge and began
carefully monitoring the experiences at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School in hopes of explaining "women's less than
equal experience" there.241 Summarizing their findings, they wrote:
We propose three related hypotheses to explain our primary
empirical finding, which is that men outperform women at
236. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-ConsciousPedagogy in Legal
Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 33, 34 (1994) (citations omitted). Cf Phyllis
Goldfarb, Pedagogy of the Suppressed: A Class on Race and the Death Penalty, 31 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 550 (2007) (exploring the benefits of a race-conscious pedagogy in the
context of discussing the death penalty); Angela Mae Kupenda, On Teaching ConstitutionalLaw
When My Race Is in Their Face, 21 L. & INEQ. 215, 217 (2003) (explaining the beneficial
challenges of race-conscious pedagogy in discussing constitutional law).
237. Catherine G. Krupnick, Women and Men in the Classroom: Inequality and Its Remedies,
1 ON TEACHING & LEARNING 18, 21 (1985), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/html/
icb.topic58474/krupnick.html.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 22.
240. Id. at21.
241. See Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, Jane Balin, Ann Bartow & Deborah Lee Stachel,
Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Women's Experiences]; see also LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE &
JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

(1997).
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the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Our research
suggests that (1) many women feel excluded from the
formal educational structure of the Law School; (2) many
women are excluded from the informal educational
environment; and (3) some women are individually affected
by the gendered stratification within the Law School, in
terms of potentially adverse psychological consequences
and more limited employment opportunities. 42
The authors resisted dispositionist attributions for their findings and
instead looked to the situation. They attributed the "gendered effect"
to "the institutional design of the law school experience, rather than
personal qualities of individual female or male students. ' 243 And, in
the situation, they argued that "[t]he pedagogical structure of the
first-year large classes, often constrained by limits on student
participation, fierce competition, a mandatory grading curve, and few
women faculty-produces alienation and a gender-stratified
hierarchy."'12" The problem, though, exceeded mere structure; the
pedagogical focus and approach, the substance of the classroom
exchanges, and the perspective most often taken and encouraged in
the classroom combined to disadvantage some groups and advantage
others:
The hierarchy within the large first-year Socratic class also
includes a hierarchy of perspectives. Those who most
identify with the institution, its faculty, its texts, and its
individualistic perspectives experience little dissonance in
the first year. On the other hand are students who import an
ambivalent identification with the institution, who resist
competitive, adversarial relationships, who do not see
themselves in the faculty, who vacillate on the emotionally
detached, "objective" perspectives inscribed as "law," and
who identify with the lives of persons who suffer from
existing political arrangements. These students experience
much dissonance.245

242. Women's Experiences, supra note 241, at 5-6.
243. Id. at 45.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
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It is that dissonance, according to Guinier and her co-authors, that
encourages women in law school to, in effect, "becom[e]
46
2'

gentlemen.
The schema for the model lawyer (and law student2 47) is

detached, autonomous, and rational. He "uses rights-based reasoning
to analyze legal problems in terms of competing, mutually exclusive
claims. He can argue all sides of any issue, because he has no
personal stake in any of his arguments.

'248

Law school thus teaches

students, by their own account, "to be 'less emotional,' 'more
objective,' and to 'put away ...

passions.'

For some, this ability to

suppress feelings [is] considered an enormous accomplishment; for
others, it is considered a defeat. Second only to the skills of
'objectivity,' students report that over time they have learned to stop
caring about others.

249

"For all practical purposes, many women students are faced with
the choice of trading their identities as women for identities as
lawyers. "250

Given those options, "some women . . . disengage[]

from law school because they find its adversarial nature, its focus on
argumentation, and its emphasis on abstract as opposed to contextual
reasoning to be unappealing and disengaging. "251

More generally,

"[o]ver three years at the Law School, women students come to
sound more like their male classmates, and significantly less like
25 2
their first-year 'selves.'

Although they frame the issue as one of gender (and, we agree),
it is also possible to frame their findings in terms of attributional
styles-that is, relative dispositionism and situationism. Law school
(particularly the first-year curriculum) tends to promote a relatively
dispositionist view of the world, the law, and the classroom-one
that, in the extreme, wrongly assumes that neither situation nor

246. Id. at 59-60.
247. Cf Sturm & Guinier, The Law School Matris, supra note 178, at 539 (explaining how
law school culture "profoundly shapes not only how students interpret and experience the
classroom, but also how students see the law and themselves as lawyers").
248. Women's Experiences, supra note 241, at 46 n. 116.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at46n.116.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 40-41.
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perspectives matter; 53 that detached rationality, abstract reason, and
careful logic should form the foundation of all relevant policy
discourse; and that rewards and punishments are allocated in life,
law, and the classroom in accordance with merit and desert as
determined through competition on level playing fields.
Entering law school are some groups of students who are more
likely to accept those dispositionist presumptions and some who tend
to embrace a relatively situationist perspective. In the typical law
school classroom, the former group's attributional style is replicated
and rewarded while the latter group's is rare and unwelcomed. The
relative dispositionists can thus drift easily on the currents of the
dispositionist law school curriculum, in classrooms with professors
who employ dispositionist pedagogy while teaching about a
dispositionist legal system.
Those relative dispositionists are
advantaged as well, inasmuch as they tend to feel (and to be)
relatively unencumbered by situational forces themselves. Each is
relatively free of strong emotional ties and at liberty to pursue
advocacy for its own sake. Each, in other words, can behave in ways
that better fit the expectations set by the ideal lawyer and law-student
schemas. The relative situationists, however, must confront and
struggle with what amounts to a hostile environment." 4 They can
come to embrace the law school model and attributional styles, they
can actively resist them, or they can dis-identify with those elements
253. The only legitimate perspective is that of the dominant group, which is not seen as
"perspective," but as clear-sightedness.
254. A related set of observations has been made about studying economics. See, e.g., Julie
A. Nelson, Feminism and Economics, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 145 (1995) ("Feminist economists
suggest that not only the content of economic courses, but also the teaching style used could
undergo a beneficial transformation."). Furthermore, the classroom experience likely has an
effect on the composition and orientation of the field as a whole. See id. at 145-46.
[E]conomic pedagogy may subtly shape the demographic composition of future
economists. Much has been written about the way in which the 'classroom climate'including instructors' patterns of interaction with men and women students and sex
stereotyping in textbooks-may make women less confident about succeeding in
particular areas. The standard androcentric biases in the topics, models and methods of
economics may be added to the list of ways in which women students may be subtly
influenced to believe that 'economics is not for (or about) me.' The current emphasis
on mathematical technique also leads to self-selection of those students, male and
female, who find abstract analysis satisfying but who may be weak in broader
analytical thinking, and self-exclusion of many students who perhaps have fine
analytical skills, but see little use for them in economics. Such selection leads to a
vicious cycle, in which students and instructors are both heavily invested in the status
quo.
Id. (citations omitted).
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of law school that create that bind. Each of those options comes at a
significant cost-perhaps sacrificing their identity,255 or their
commitments, or their performance, or their aspirations,256 or some
combination of those.257 That dynamic may be part of what Professor
Patricia Williams was getting at when recounting her years as a law
student: "My abiding recollection of being a student at Harvard Law
School is a sense of being invisible. 258
One of us (with Jay Hook) has collected some additional
(experimental) evidence that provides support for the idea that
women in law school "become gentlemen." (Because the results are
preliminary and the experiment is part of other work now in
progress, we will offer only a loose and cursory sketch here.)
Basically, two groups of first-year students at Harvard Law School
were asked to read some paragraphs that roughly communicated the
following:
Maria had a genetic disorder, PKU, the effects of which she
minimized through tedious and expensive care throughout
her childhood.
When Maria went to college, she
discontinued her medical regimen and later became
pregnant.
Her baby was born with some learning
disabilities, which could be attributed to the fact that Maria
was no longer taking care of herself-a risk that Maria had
been aware of.
Those students were then asked to answer a question much like the
following: "Various people and factors were responsible for what

255. See, e.g., Brad Sears, Queer L, 1 NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 234, 246-47 (1995),
available at http://www.ibiblio.org/gaylaw/issue2/sears.html (recounting his first-year experience
at Harvard Law School and how he struggled to keep his pre-law school identity alive).
256. See Fox, The Good Law School, supra note 230, at 482 ("The tendency to marginalize
students and their personal educational needs and choices is responsible for some of the greatest
failures of the law school," including students who feel "disengaged, unexcited and alienated.").
257. Situations often influence, among other things, people's construals, attributions, and
behavior. For instance, legal economists are more apt to assume the human animal is rational and
self-serving than are people unschooled in the economic approach. With such a schema and
expectation in place, economists are more likely to behave that way themselves. Robert H. Frank,
Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993); see also Hillary Haley & Jim Sidanius, Person-Organization
Congruence and the Maintenance of Group-Based Social Hierarchy: A Social Dominance
Perspective, 8 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 187 (2005) (describing the various
processes that tend to match people's sociopolitical attitudes with institutional environments).
258. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 55 (1991).
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happened to Maria's baby. What percentage out of a total 100
percent responsibility do you attribute to her?"
One group of subjects had not yet taken torts-a course that, we
hypothesized, would tend to encourage and reward relatively
dispositionist attributions of causation, responsibility, and blame.
The other group had taken torts.
Part of what we discovered is summarized in the chart below.
Before torts, the men and women, on average, assigned quite
different percentages of blame to Maria-men assigning
significantly more than women did. In the group that had taken torts,
as we predicted, men and women both tended to assign more
responsibility to Maria (though the increase for men was not
statistically significant), and women were now attributing roughly
the same amount of responsibility as men were (the increase for
women was statistically significant and difference between men and
women in the post-torts group was not significant). Put another way,
the data suggested that women were, in an attributional approach,
"becoming gentlemen." Or, as we might put it, relative situationists
were "becoming dispositionists."
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If law school is responsible for such a transformation, that
would be troubling in part because, as we have summarized above,
social science indicates that the dispositionist attributions tend to be
highly inaccurate--even as they provide a false sense that the
existing outcomes are just. In other words, they may promote
injustice. If social psychology and the mind sciences are correct to
warn us about such errors in our attributions, then we should worry
about the possibility that this error is being amplified and
continuously reinforced in law school. Indeed, part of what it may
mean to learn to "think like a lawyer" may simply be to become
more dispositionist-and thus to be more inclined to make
attributions that are relatively inaccurate and system-justifying.
Perhaps we should be most troubled by the possibility that law
school is likely advantaging some groups and disadvantaging others,
even as it pretends to provide a level playing field for all who
enter.259 As Guinier and her co-authors elaborate, although women
may be becoming gentlemen, their "academic performance over time
does not mirror that of men. 26° "[T]here is an academic cost, and
perhaps a mental health cost, to discarding passions, politics,
emotions, and community-based identities that were once central to
the student's identity."26 ' In sum, "the educational strategies of the
Law School sustain hierarchy, legitimate inequity in the name of
merit, and yield serious, adverse consequence[s] for many
262
women."
A very similar dynamic is no doubt at work with respect to other
historically and culturally disadvantaged groups. In an important
article on the experience of racial minorities, for instance, Professor
Crenshaw argues that "[f]aw school discourse proceeds with the
259. Predictably, the conventional explanation for many of the phenomena that they studied is
attributed to disposition. Id. at 83-84 ("The men make the rules and then develop predictors of
performance under those rules. When women do not achieve predicted rates of performance, the
men question the women, rather than question the rules.").
260. Women's Experiences, supra note 241, at 40-41.
261. Id. at 48.
262. Id. at 98. There is much to say about the role of the "lawyer" and "law student"
stereotypes, and how they might impact the performance of different groups at law schoolowing to stereotype threat, implicit associations, and similar dynamics. Although they are
beyond the scope of this paper, they do form a very important part of what we consider to be the
situation of law school (and beyond), and we are at work on another paper that we hope will
provide a reasonably comprehensive inventory of such interior situational influences on
educational outcomes. See Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Standardized Test Nation (Sept. 27,
2008) (working paper, on file with authors).
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expectation that students will learn to perform the standard mode of
legal
reasoning
and
embrace
its
presumption
of
perspectivelessness. ''16 3 According to Crenshaw, this approach
asserts "that legal analysis can be taught without directly addressing
conflicts of individual values, experiences, and world views" and
transmits this assumption to students by "discounting the relevance
of any particular perspective in legal analysis."2 " The norm of
perspectivelessness "discount[s] the relevance of any particular
perspective in legal analysis and ... posit[s] an analytical stance that
'
has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics."265
It is as
if situation is irrelevant, and all that matters are the facts-and their
neutral interpretation.266
This norm of perspectivelessness is problematic in general,
and particularly burdensome on minority students. While it
seems relatively straightforward that objects, issues, and
other phenomena are interpreted from the vantage point of
the observer, many law classes are conducted as though it is
possible to create, weigh, and evaluate rules and arguments
in ways that neither reflect nor privilege any particular
perspective or world view. Thus, law school discourse
proceeds with the expectation that students will learn to
perform the standard mode of legal reasoning and embrace
its presumption of perspectivelessness. When this
expectation is combined with the fact that what is
understood as objective or neutral is often the embodiment
of a white middle-class world view, minority students are
placed in a difficult situation. To assume the air of
perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom,
minority students must participate in the discussion as
though they were not African-American or Latino, but
colorless legal analysts. The consequence of adopting this
colorless mode is that when the discussion involves racial
minorities, minority students are expected to stand apart
263. Crenshaw, supra note 236, at 35.

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. "Perspectivelessness" obviously has much in common with the more general concern
about the gaping void between the classroom and reality. See supra text accompanying notes
115-116.
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from their history, their identity, and sometimes their own
immediate circumstances and discuss issues without
making reference to the reality that the "they" or "them"
being discussed is from their perspective "we" or "us."
Conversely, on the few occasions when minority students
are invited to incorporate their racial identity and
experiences into their comments, they often feel as though
they have been put on the spot. Moreover, their comments
are frequently disregarded by other students who believe
that since race figures prominently in such comments, the
minority students-unlike themselves-are expressing biased,
self-interested, or subjective opinions. The result is that
minority students can seldom ground their analysis in their
own racial experiences without risking some kind of formal
or informal sanction. Minority students escape the twin
problems of objectification and subjectification in
discussions when minority experiences are deemed to be
completely irrelevant, or are obscured by the centering of
the discussion elsewhere. The price of this sometimes
welcomed invisibility, however, can be intense alienation.267
Crenshaw's description seems very much in sync with that of
Guinier and her co-authors and with our argument that law school is
encouraging dispositionism and punishing those who seek to offer a
more situationist account of human behavior-in the law or in the
classroom.
The similarity between Crenshaw's distinctions and our own
becomes more evident when examining how she describes the role of
perspective and the illusion of perspectivelessness (or, straining a bit,
"situationlessness") playing out, not just in the classroom, but also in
the law itself. 68 Specifically, she discusses "the tension between
competing frameworks for defining and remedying racial
discrimination" 269:
Perspectives are important in determining the scope of
antidiscrimination law. Yet minority perspectives are
rendered irrelevant by some of the United States Supreme
267. Crenshaw, supra note 236, at 35-36.
268. See id. at 46 ("Minority perspectives are devalued not simply in the discussion of
doctrine, but in the construction of doctrine as well.").

269. Id.
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Court's approaches in which the significance of the victim's
experience of domination is minimized by the search for an
actor who intentionally and irrationally discriminated
against certain victims. The result of this search is that
protection afforded to minorities is limited.
Discriminatory intent is increasingly the sine qua non
of a successful claim. The United States Supreme Court
has adopted the view that the injury is found in the
intentional deprivation of rights on the basis of race. Thus,
the inquiry focuses on the beliefs, actions, and experiences
of perpetrators. This effort to ground antidiscrimination
protection in the identification of a particular discriminating
actor might appear to be rational and noncontroversial in
the absence of a competing view. Yet, when we contrast
this view-which ...[might be] labeled the "discrimination
approach"-with what we called the "domination
approach," another equally plausible view is revealed. In
the domination model the search for a particular perpetrator
is not as important as seeking to remedy the conditions
which render the community in question subordinate to
whites. Such an approach relies on the reintroduction of
historical details and the inclusion of the victims' personal
experiences and aspirations which initially gave rise to the
case. This domination model values the perspectives of the
victims and when those perspectives are introduced, the
conclusions drawn from the discrimination model make less
sense. Unlike the discrimination approach, the domination
model privileges the perspective of the victim. Her views,
her experiences and her condition become the focal point of
the analysis. Under the domination model, intentionalitywhich is the determinative factor under the discrimination
model-is but an additional insult to an already established
270
injury.
In other words, the dominant perspective is dispositionist, focused as
it is on "intentions," "perpetrators," "the identification of a particular
discriminating actor," while the alternative perspective is situationist,
inasmuch as it focuses on "seeking to remedy the conditions which
270. Id. at 46-47 (footnotes omitted).
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render the community in question subordinate to whites," it "relies

on the reintroduction of historical details," and it "values the
perspectives of the victims" and their "views,... experiences, and
... condition[s]. 271 In calling for the law to look beyond the victim

(often the first and only person to be blamed) and the perpetrator
(typically the second, and only other potential person to be blamed)
to circumstances and context, Crenshaw is calling for a more
situationist approach. 72
The failure to take a situationist perspective is exactly what
many law students-particularly those who come to law school
keenly aware of, and troubled by, the power of situational forcesfind alienating about the law school experience. The problem is not
merely a matter of ignored perspective; it is that a host of obvious
situational forces are dismissed as non-existent. Even worse, many
students perceive those same forces as the foundation of injustices to
which law school, of all places, seems blind or insensitive. The
student who offers such arguments is met with anything from
indifference to indignance. 2 " The arguments themselves are seen as
fanciful and dangerous-the product of ignorance, bias,
hypersensitivity, and emotion and the stuff of unwarranted
intergroup animosity.274 Little wonder that those who see racial
issues as, at least in part, the consequence of broad situational forces
often find the law school experience particularly unpleasant. As
Professor Crenshaw explains:

271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. We might go further than Crenshaw suggests and would look to the situation of the
"perpetrator," for instance. Our point, however, is simply that Crenshaw's preferred policy
approach would be, at least somewhat, a more situationist regime.
273. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Note, Listen, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 523, 523 (1998)
(describing how, as a law student, situational justice is "buried by the discourse of the dominant
culture").
274. Cf Crenshaw, supra note 236, at 46.
For a number of reasons discussed above, minority perspectives are often excluded and
dominant perspectives are privileged in the legal inquiry. Moreover, dominant
perspectives are not identified or associated with any characteristics; the perspective is
nameless.
Most debilitating for minorities, however, is that while dominant
perspectives are granted the protection of apparent objectivity, minority perspectives
are identified as such and viewed as subjective and biased. As a result, legal concepts,
claims, and categories that value minority perspectives are sometimes viewed as
suspect or biased.
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Given the infrequency with which most law teachers
create the space for and legitimize responses that
acknowledge the significance of a racially-informed
perspective, it is not surprising that minority students often
choose the role of "good student" rather than run the risk of
appearing to be incapable of exercising the proper decorum
and engagement in legal analysis. Such experiences teach
minority students that in law school discourse, their cultural
and experiential knowledge is not important or relevant.
Indeed, they learn that any failure to observe the
constructed dichotomy between the rational-read non-racial
and non-personal-and the emotional-read racial and
experiential-may elicit derision or disregard. To expect
minority students to feel comfortable or to be creative in
such a classroom is the equivalent of asking someone to
perform a two-handed task with one hand tied behind her
back.275
So, what to do? As the next section argues, there seems to be
widespread agreement that at least part of the solution involves
moving from our dispositionist approach toward a more situationist
one. The very fact that there is such agreement on the part of so
many critics of our current system offers a compelling reason for
why now may be an opportune moment for meaningful change.
E. Building a Bridge to Situationism
Scholars who have considered solutions to those sorts of
problems have often proposed reforms that would, among other
276
things, encourage a more situationist curriculum and pedagogy.
When Professors Minow and Rakoff discuss the gap between the real
world and the classroom, 277 they argue that "[e]ven the most
imaginative and energetic teacher simply needs different
materials. '27 8 "Students ought to be presented with relatively dense

275. Id. at 39.
276. This "solution" was implicit in many of the criticisms that we reviewed in the previous
two subsections of the conventional Langdellian model.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 115-116.
278. Rakoff& Minow, supra note 90, at 601.
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materials that lay out a situation, experienced as a problem for a
person, or group of people, for legal treatment .. "'

Professor Menkel-Meadow's "ideal legal curriculum," which
"would situate law and its functions in a broader human context"
includes features that we, too, would like to see as part of the basic
curriculum and that a situationist torts book would attempt to
promote.2 10 "[S]ituat[ing] law" would mean, among other things, that
students would "study those fields whose knowledge base informs
how and why law is made-sociology, history, political philosophy,
political science, and anthropology-so law students could learn
about the historical and cultural variations in how human beings
create and enforce norms for their coexistence." '' Menkel-Meadow
argues that first-year students:
should also encounter ...a real or simulated "client"

. .

. to

understand how legal problems present themselves. Thus,
students would learn simultaneously about how law came
about and what it can and cannot do to solve social and
human problems. Such teaching would ask, as its central
themes, what produces the norms by which people live and
guide themselves and others, how do those norms vary in
different cultural and social settings, and what
predispositions or patterns occur in different social
groupings.282
Similarly, Mary O'Brien Hylton writes:
No area of the law can or should be taught without regular,
thoughtful reference to material conditions. Toward this
end,

.

. . students deserve more than the often shallow

rhetoric of efficiency, personal choice, and incentives that
frequently inform[] most class discussions. Inequality of
material conditions is not a side issue-it is at the heart of
the law. 83

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 604.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 580.
Id.
Id. at 580-81.
Hylton, supra note 233, at 1362.
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Consider, also Professor Crenshaw's suggestions for addressing
some of the flaws in the typical law school classroom when racial
issues are implicated by a case:
Some of these dilemmas can be addressed by altering the
way racial issues are framed, by presenting racism as a
serious societal problem, and by explicitly deprivileging
dominant perspectives. Instructors wishing to explore
racial issues without contributing to the anxiety of minority
students should resist framing minority experiences in ways
that make such experiences appear to be disconnected to
broader issues and that can be easily forgotten as soon as
the policy discussion is over. Instead, the frame should be
shifted so as to illuminate the connection between racial
subordination and the values and interests that appear to be
race-neutral or that are simply taken for granted.284
Situationism is committed to making just those connections and to
revealing the ways in which the dominant, dispositionist perspective
contributes to the very problems-racial or otherwise-that it
removes from the classroom discussion and from the minds of
students as a topic of any relevance.
Crenshaw astutely observes that "[w]hen the instructor places an
entire legal framework at issue, minority perspectives can be
included in ways that illuminate better the racial consequences of
'
dominant values, concepts, and rules."285
By challenging the
dispositionist premises of tort law, situationism opens the door for
alternative perspectives. More broadly, a pedagogical approach that
reveals the situational contingency of the law simultaneously
undermines the seeming neutrality, correctness, and naturalness of
dominant dispositionist presumptions.286 When the law is a ball, the
question is no longer just one of learning what it contains, but also
one of figuring out how it came to be that way and whether it ought
to be that way.287
284. Crenshaw, supra note 236, at 43.
285. Id.
286. Cf id.at 48 ("[T]he introduction of competing perspectives can destabilize this apparent
objectivity. More importantly, creating space for competing perspectives can loosen the
constraints upon those who have been forced to adopt a perspective which is often at odds with
their reality. By contrasting alternative points of view with the dominant perspective, the
subjectivity of legal analysis is revealed.").
287. Id. at 43.
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In sum, there seems to be a consensus among critics of the
conventional model of teaching law that a more situationist approach
would be an important part of any solution. That consensus provides
us greater optimism about the prospects for a situationist torts
casebook.
F. If You Build the Bridge, They Will Come

A sixth reason that a situationist casebook might catch on is that
its very existence may alter people's perceptions about how best to
understand and teach law. As explored in Part III, the dispositionist
casebooks have had a significant self-perpetuating effect on how law
is conceived of and taught. 88 The absence of a tractable alternative
to the library full of Langdellian casebooks partly explains why
dispositionism still thrives-which, in turn, helps explain why those
conventional casebooks still dominate the law school experience. 89
A presence of a situationist option is likely a necessary element
for any effort that seeks to break that reinforcing cycle. 9 As
Professor Menkel-Meadow underscores when lamenting the rigidity
of legal education,29' a key mechanism for change will involve law
teachers both acknowledging that "the study of law is itself
necessarily a multi-disciplinary enterprise, borrowing from ... the
insights, methods, and canons of other fields to tell us about how we
' In that way, a situationist torts casebook would
govern ourselves."292
represent and help catalyze pedagogical reform. 93
288. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
290. For many of the reasons we discussed in Part V.G, infra, however, we do not think that it
is a sufficient component for change-or at least not rapid or significant change. Coupled with
the growing commitments on the part of legal academic leaders and prominent law schools to
foster change, however, we are more optimistic regarding the catalyzing effect of such a
situationist casebook. See infra notes 294-305 and accompanying text (summarizing those
commitments).
291. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 72, at 594-95.
292. Id. at 557.
293. Cf Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology
Teach Us About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices, 23
QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 643, 706 (2004). After reviewing the implications of the mind sciences for
teaching law, Lerner concluded in 2004:
[P]revalent law school curriculum and pedagogy are not well suited to producing
[effective and ethical] lawyers . . . . Seeing this, many law professors have
experimented with course design and delivery seeking to impart these traits and
practices to their students. Recent discoveries in social psychology and neuroscience
demonstrate rather clearly that a pedagogy based upon contextually rich, emotionally
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G. Building Bridges
The final and arguably most important reason why meaningful
situationist reform may be possible now is that many U.S. law
schools are currently contemplating major reform. Indeed, some law
schools are actually beginning to implement such reforms. Viewed
broadly, those curricular efforts are in the situationist direction as
legal educators seek to promote experiential, contextual learning and
to bridge many of the gaps we have sketched.
No curricular shift is more seismic in its symbolism and
significance than the one now underway at Harvard Law School, the
first phase of which commenced in the Fall of 2007.294 Langdell's
legacy is, of course, still driving nails at Harvard, but the reform
reflects a deliberate, collective attempt to rethink and remold legal
295
education at the very place where the hammer's die was first cast.
Advocated by the Harvard Law School administration under the
farsighted and pragmatic leadership of Dean Elena Kagan and
embraced by the faculty and the alumni, the reform seeks to prepare
future lawyers for economic, cultural, and technological changes by
requiring them to become skilled in modern system design, problemsolving techniques, and innovative approaches to legal issues.296
Although individual faculty members vary in how intensely and
substantively they embrace those goals in their traditional classes, it
is fair to say that all Harvard Law School students are now presented
with more complex, fact-intensive problems, many of which intersect
with practical and real-world issues. Added to the first-year
experience are courses in international and comparative law,

engaging, role-based, problem solving, coupled with ongoing reflective discourse is
most likely to significantly enhance law students' effective engagement with, and
mastery of, the role of ethical practitioner. It is now up to us to engage that learning in
our teaching.
Id.
294. Cf Newfeld, supra note 227, at 512-13 (summarizing the significance of Harvard's
practices for understanding trends in legal education).
295. The significance of the Harvard shift has been noted by a number of legal commentators.
See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Educating Lawyers Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the
Common Law and the Case Method, 35 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 37-38 (2007); Jill Schachner
Chanen, Re-engineering the JD.: Schools Across the Country Are Teaching Less About the Law
and More About Lawyering, A.B.A. J, July 2007, at 42.
296. See HLS Faculty UnanimouslyApproves First-yearCurricularReform, HLS NEWS, Oct.
6, 2006, http://wwwlaw.harvard.edu/news/2006/10/06curriculum.php
[hereinafter HLS
Faculty].
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legislation and regulation, and complex problem solving. Common
law courses are being trimmed and truncated to make room. The
explicit goals behind the changes are as follows:
* greater attention to statutes and regulations;
* introduction to the institutions and processes of public
law;
* systematic attention to international and comparative law
and economic systems;
* opportunities for students to address, alone and in teams,
complex, fact-intensive problems as they arise in the
world (rather than digested into legal doctrines in
appellate opinions) and to generate and evaluate
solutions through private ordering, regulation, litigation
and other strategies;
* more sustained occasions to reflect on the entire
enterprise of law and legal studies, the assumptions and
methods of contemporary U.S. law and the perspectives
provided by other disciplines, and to develop a common
fund of ideas and approaches relevant to designing
effective and just laws and institutions.297
Rather than master or regurgitate mere doctrines as discerned
through appellate opinions or digested in outlines, first-year students
at Harvard Law School are now expected to "generate and evaluate
solutions through private ordering, regulation, litigation and other
' The experience exposes students to more frequent and
strategies."298
sustained examination of connections between one area of law and
another, between one legal system and another, and between legal
Such comparisons and
theory and other academic disciplines.
contrasts help to bring into relief many of the contingent traditions
and debatable assumptions underlying our legal system.299 Curricular
reform at Harvard Law School unmistakably, though not explicitly,
reflects both the desire to shift, and a means of shifting, away from

297. Id.; see also The Honorable James R. Zazzali, International Human Rights: An
Overview: Annual Vanderbilt Address to the New Jersey Alumni of Harvard Law School, 37
SETON HALL L. REV. 661, 661 n.2 (2007) (discussing how the increasing importance of
international law is reflected in Harvard Law School's curricular reform).
298. See HLS Faculty, supra note 296.
299. Id.
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the dispositionist conventions and toward a more situationist
approach to law.
Having said that, we nonetheless find compelling Professor
Kathryn Stanchi's recent criticism of Harvard Law School's new
curriculum. She argues, in effect, that the sort of change needed in
the first-year curriculum may go beyond that contemplated in the
reform. Indeed, creating a special course devoted to the new (more
situationist) approach may underscore its marginality, not exhibit its
centrality. Stanchi writes:
Even Harvard's new first year curriculum, which laudably
requires a course that integrates legal theory with problem
solving, to some extent maintains the segregation; the
Problems and Theories course is separated from Legal
Research and Writing, and both of these courses look like
rogue outsiders when compared with the dominant
curriculum of doctrinal courses.
In my view, this
separation is a mistake, even--especially-in the first year.
The separation . . . does not serve the purposes we
want our pedagogy to serve.3"0
The good news, as Professor Stanchi recognizes, is that the division
is unnecessary. We endorse some of her other suggestions for
reform, the "centerpiece" of which is "to increase the number of
courses that integrate doctrine, theory and skills so that students learn
to use both doctrine and legal theory, including critical theory, in a
practical context." More specifically, she calls for
[R]eplac[ing] some of the courses that emphasize teaching
doctrine by the case method, . . . particularly in the first
year. And, we should name the courses accordingly, so
they do not sound as if they are all about the doctrine. In
short, if we want to teach "thinking like a lawyer, we
should be explicit about doing it. Most importantly, we
should define that "thinking" broadly, to include not only
the basic skills ... but also mastery of doctrine and legal
theory, including critical theory.30 '
A situationist torts course could be one concrete step toward "do[ing]
it right." Furthermore, such changes strike us as consonant with,
300. Stanchi, supra note 129, at 611.
301. Id. at 612.
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though not mandated by, Harvard Law School's curricular reforms
and aspirations.
Other law schools have taken similar, though more modest,
Stanford Law
situationism-enhancing curricular alterations.
School, for instance, recently announced changes to the upper-level
curriculum that will place less emphasis on adversarial tactics and
techniques.""3 2
"team-oriented,
problem-solving
more
on
Georgetown University Law Center now requires its first-year
students to enroll in "Law in a Global Context," a course premised
on the idea that "the legal problems today's students must be
prepared to face increasingly transcend national boundaries and
involve more than one legal system." 3 Similarly, the University of
Michigan Law School now requires its students to complete a twocredit course in transnational law.3 °4
The speculation, particularly among those who study law school
pedagogy, is that other American law schools will increasingly
follow the paths being cleared by such pioneering institutions.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has examined law school curriculum from an
unconventional perspective. Like moviegoers grown attached to a
volleyball named Wilson, most law students and legal scholars have
grown attached to the idea that the conventional law school
curriculum is moved from its own personality. A situationist
approach is based on the view that that curriculum, like the law itself,
is more like a volleyball, moved by situational forces and not by
some imagined disposition. 36 And at this moment, such situational
forces appear to be gaining traction.
302. See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School DisappointsLaw Students, The
Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 249-50 (2007) (discussing curricula
changes by Stanford Law School).
303. See Week One: Law in Global Context, Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 7-11,
2008) (http://www.law.georgetown.edu/documents/weekone2008.pdf).
304. See Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass Is HalfFull, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 29, 35-36 (2007).
305. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the
Cognitive Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413, 415-17 (2007);
Maxeiner, supra note 293, at 44-46.
306. Some of our readers have had misgivings about the situationist approach because they
perceive it as ideologically loaded. Undoubtedly, it is. But no approach to law is any less loaded
with ideological implications. Robert E. Lane writes: "At the roots of every ideology there are
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Indeed, this is a particularly good situation for significant
pedagogical or curricular change. A consensus that our legal
education system is broken now exists among many powerful
members of some of the most influential law schools. Those leaders
have gone beyond merely recognizing the problem; they are taking
significant steps to fix it. In short, the prospects for substantial

premises about the nature of causation, the agents of causation, [and] the appropriate ways for
explaining complex events." ROBERT E. LANE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: WHY THE AMERICAN
COMMON MAN BELIEVES WHAT HE DOES 319 (1962). Similarly, at the roots of every approach
to tort law (or virtually any law) are premises about the nature of causation, the agents of
causation, and the appropriate ways for explaining complex events. The situationist and the
dispositionist attributions are examples of such competing premises. Indeed, they have been
linked to competing ideologies. See Benforado & Hanson, GreatAttributionalDivide, supra note
80, at 314.
With respect to that competition, there are several key points to keep in mind about the
situationist approach. First, the idea that tort law is, as seen from the dispositionist perspective,
somehow ideologically neutral is an illusion. Cf Crenshaw, supra note 236, at 40.
The appearance of perspectivelessness is simply the illusion by which the dominant
perspective is made to appear neutral, ordinary, and beyond question. As a result,
while the perspectives of minority students are often identified as racial, the
perspectives of their majority classmates are not. Moreover, when the instructor
presents as a 'given' the perspectivelessness of a particular rule or value, then many
decisions that effectively burden minority group members will appear to both the
instructor and most students to be the result of an unbiased, objective legal analysis.
As long as other perspectives are obscured by the illusion of objectivity, the fact that
courts are making choices that privilege the perspectives and interests of some groups
over others will go unrecognized.
Id.
[T]he reasonableness of a particular legal framework or resolution depends, in turn, on
whether the perspective it empowers happens to be a perspective that is familiar to or
shared by the analyst. When the analyst shares the perspective that is privileged, the
process seems to be reasonable, rational and objective. Because the subjectivity of the
perspective that is empowered by the doctrinal framework is rarely perceived, the
results that follow from privileging that perspective are seldom regarded as being
arbitrary, irrational or biased.
Id. at 48. Second, an important part of taking a situationist perspective is to recognize and
examine the presence, origins, and effects of such illusions. Third, tort law is an important place
to have ideological discussion in law school precisely because, as recent tort debates illustrate, it
is one of the few areas of law where the ideological stakes are explicit and salient. See generally
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,supra note 20. As Professors Prosser and Keeton
put it in 1964: "Perhaps more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battleground
for social theory." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 53, at 15. A close examination of that
battleground reveals that the bigger part of the social theoretical fight is actually a contest
between relative dispositionists and relative situationists. See Benforado & Hanson, Great
Attributional Divide, supra note 80; Benforado & Hanson, Costs of Dispositionism, supra note
192; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, supra note 68. Finally and most
importantly, social science has shown that dispositionist presumptions underlying legal and lay
conceptions of the person are more or less wrong. See Benforado & Hanson, Costs of
Dispositionism, supra note 192, at 64-65. Thus, we do not call for a situationist approach on
ideological grounds but on accuracy grounds.
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reform seem more likely today than they have been in the last 140
years.
In our view, the turn away from Langdell and towards
situationist tort law is long overdue.
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